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I. INTRODUCTION
Federal aiding and abetting law, which has been spinning out of control for
quite some time, has now spun totally out of control. For decades, prosecutors have
successfully used pliant legal doctrines to impose criminal accessorial liability.
Today, prosecutors are inconsistently applying and misapplying these doctrines to
the point of abuse, confusion, and unfairness.'
The problem has several dimensions. First, misapplication of aiding and
abetting principles invariably results in an improper easing of the requisite mens rea
requirements for conviction. As a result, the integrity of the criminal justice process
is fundamentally compromised.
* Professor of Law, Howard University School of Law. I wish to thank Vemida Chaney, J.D.
2005, Howard University School of Law, for her research assistance. I also wish to thank Dean Kurt
Schmoke and Howard University School of Law for providing research funding for this Article.
This Article uses male pronouns to refer to federal criminal defendants. The majority of federal
criminal defendants are male, although the percentage of female defendants is increasing. See UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOKOF CRIMINALJUSTICE
STATISTICS 2002 417 (2003) (noting that males constituted 85.4 % of all convicted federal defendants
in 2000). This Article uses female pronouns to refer to legal counsel. Females make up 48 % of
currently enrolled law students in ABA-approved law schools. ABA 2004 Enrollment Statistics, Letter
by David Rosenlieb, Data Specialist for Office of the Consultant on Legal Education and Admissions
to the Bar, Jan. 12, 2005 (copy on file with the author). See also Claire G. Schwab, A Shifting Gender
Divide: The Impact of Gender on Education at Columbia Law School in the New Millennium, 36
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 299, 310 (2003) (noting the enrollment trends of the past two decades
indicate women will constitute a majority of all law students around 2005).
I. A recent article noted the multiple approaches to mens rea standards for federal criminal
offenses and concluded that federal aiding and abetting law is in a state of "chaos." Baruch Weiss,
What Were They Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer Under
Federal Law, 70 FORDHAm L. REV. 1341, 1355 (2002).
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Second, there is confusion on what constitutes aiding and abetting. The
common shorthand term "aider and abettor" connotes some lesser actor-not the
individual who actually commits the offense--but the individual who offers
assistance to the primary actor. In this context, the primary actor is generally
considered the more culpable actor. While this paradigm is true in many
circumstances, it is incomplete and misleading in several critical respects.
Most importantly, doctrinal confusion results when the principal is
systematically considered the more culpable actor. The connotation of aider and
abettor often ignores the other aspect of the concept: the individual who
commands, induces, or procures another to actually commit the offense. In this
context, the "commander or inducer" is the leader and, in many cases, is more
culpable than the principal. In modem legal terminology, the term "principal"
means the person who physically commits the offense; it does not denote relative
culpability in the criminal hierarchy. Accordingly, in this scenario, the aider,
abettor, commander, or inducer who is the more culpable actor should receive a
more severe sentence. To cover this eventuality, federal aiding and abetting law
makes the aider, abettor, commander, or inducer punishable as a principal and thus
eligible for the same punishment as the individual who commits the actual offense.2
2. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000) provides, "Whoever commits an offense against the United States or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."
In most doctrinal areas, the aider and abettor is punishable as a principal and thus subject to
identical punishment as the principal. See, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 979 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th
Cir. 1992) (holding the aiding and abetting statute applies to the entire criminal code); United States
v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1233 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (noting that "every time Congress has passed
a new criminal statute the aider and abettor provision has automatically kicked in and made the aiders
and abettors ... punishable as principals"). This approach is in contrast to common law distinctions
such as accessory before the fact and accessory after the fact--designations that denoted distinct and
relatively less serious offenses compared with the actual commission of the offense. Federal law, in line
with most modem criminal law, eliminates those arcane distinctions and, with regard to the range of
punishment, does not generally distinguish between those charged as principals and those charged as
aiders and abettors. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15-19 (1980).
In a few doctrinal areas, aiders and abettors may be subject to a different, lesser punishment than
the principal. Also, legislative intent may dictate extending aiding and abetting principles to reach only
high-level operatives. See Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 186 (1993) (holding no civil liability
for a RICO violation under aiding and abetting principles); United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 69
(2d Cir. 2000) (noting that no aiding and abetting liability exists under 21 U.S.C. § 848, the federal
drug kingpin statute); United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir. 1994) (extending the Reves
rationale to criminal liability), abrogated on other grounds by Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52
(1997). But see Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d at 1231-37 (holding that aiding and abetting liability exists under
21 U.S.C. § 848). For a discussion on the use of aiding and abetting liability as a way to avoid impact
of the Reves doctrine, see NORMAN ABRAMs & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIM[NAL LAW AND ITS
ENFORCEMENT 68-71 (3d ed. Supp. 2005).
In the recent prosecution of one of the notorious District of Columbia-area snipers, Virginia
prosecutors successfully sought the death penalty against John Allen Muhammad. Jon Ward,
Muhammad Request for New Trial Rejected, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at A09. The trial court
rejected the defense that the applicable Virginia death penalty statute (VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2
(2004)) exclusively applied only to the actual triggerman. Matthew Celia, No Dallying on Executions:
Virginia Offers Shortest Waitfor Prisoners on Death Row, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2003, at A02. The
prosecution argued the statute should be interpreted to permit the death penalty for all individuals who
"actively participat[ed] in the deaths that they caused." Josh White, Triggerman Provision Weighed
[Vol. 57: 85
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Third, there is debate over the requisite mens rea for an aider and abettor.
Aiding and abetting seems to be a specific intent offense-meaning an individual
must knowingly intend to assist in the commission of the actual offense. A lower
mens rea requirement, even for general intent offenses, may cast too broad a net to
impose criminal liability.'
Fourth, the federal aiding and abetting statute, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2, is
representative of most modem aiding and abetting statutes. These modem statutes
replaced the complex and arcane common law rules concerning accessories to a
crime-individuals who do not actually commit the completed offense. The federal
aiding and abetting statute makes an individual who aids and abets punishable as
a principal.4 Thus, the statute, instead of setting forth a separate crime, delineates
a theory of legal complicity like the Pinkerton conspiracy doctrine,5 which imposes
liability on individuals for particular federal offenses who do not physically commit
those offenses."
In addition to the incomplete connotation of aiding and abetting, which omits
the commands or induces concept, many of the flexible aiding and abetting
principles are often mischaracterized. As a result, several oft-stated generalizations
ignore critical subtleties and are therefore subject to misapplication.7  These
subtleties concern the proper scope of prosecutorial flexibility and consistency of
theory, including the use of uncharged and alternative theories of guilt, whether
juror unanimity is required as to a defendant's status as the principal or the aider
and abettor, and related issues arising from evidence ofjoint criminal participation.
in Sniper Case: State May Not Need to Prove Who Fired, WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 2003, at B5. The
Virginia Supreme Court rejected Muhammad's "actual triggerman" argument, and the court affirmed
the two convictions and death sentences at issue in that appeal. Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 611
S.E.2d 537,546,554-558 (Va. 2005). The Virginia legislature recently considered amending the death
penalty statute to make clear that eligibility for the death penalty is not limited to the actual triggerman.
Michael D. Shear, Bill Would Extend Death Penalty to Accomplices, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2004, at
B5. In a related matter, the United States Supreme Court recentlyheld that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of individuals who were juveniles when they committed the crime. See Roper
v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1200 (2005). As a result, Muhammad's accomplice, Lee Boyd Malvo,
who was a minor when the murder spree occurred, cannot be executed.
3. For example, the Nevada Supreme Court recently overturned precedent that had adopted the
natural and probable consequences doctrine of accomplice liability for specific intent offenses. See
Sharma v. State, 56 P.3d 868, 871-72 (Nev. 2002). The prosecution now must establish a higher
standard--that a defendant charged with aiding and abetting a specific intent crime took action to aid
another "with the intent that the other person commit the charged crime." Id. at 872.
4. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
5. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). Pinkerton liability cannot serve as an after-
the-fact justification to save a conviction. Liability under this theory may be upheld on appeal only if
the judge gave the Pinkerton instruction at trial. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613,618
(1949); United States v. Spudic, 795 F.2d 1334, 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
6. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645-48.
7. For simplicity's sake, this Article uses the shorthand vernacular of "aiding and abetting" to
refer to 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), with full recognition that the statute encompasses the commander and inducer
concept as well.
3
Kurland: To Aid, Abet, Counsel, Command, Induce, or Procure the Commission
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Few commentators seriously question the utility of most modem federal aiding
and abetting principles. Properly applied, these principles reflect the societal
judgment that an aider and abettor is as morally culpable as the principal offender
and should thus suffer the same type of conviction and potential punishment as the
principal. However, some applications of aiding and abetting liability are
problematic and raise constitutional questions. This Article analyzes modem federal
aiding and abetting liability and attempts to establish its proper boundaries. A multi-
defendant criminal prosecution or a prosecution of one defendant involving multi-
party criminality' is not simply a game of musical chairs-and courts must take care
to give appropriate jury instructions and to correlate those instructions to the
evidence presented as to each defendant. Otherwise, the necessarily broad and
flexible aiding and abetting concepts, vital to the fair administration ofjustice, will
be exposed as abusive in application and thus subject to necessary doctrinal
retrenchment. This reevaluation of aiding and abetting doctrine complements other
emerging criminal law developments concerning prosecutorial overreaching, which
is similarly in need of reevaluation and refinement.9
Part H of this Article analyzes the current state of federal aiding and abetting
doctrine and further details the concerns noted above. Most significantly, this
Article contends that if the government proceeds on alternate legal theories that a
defendant was either the principal or an aider and abettor, due process requires juror
unanimity, at least in situations where the evidence would establish the defendant
as an accessory before the fact at common law. This doctrinal adjustment would
reinvigorate the increasingly ignored requirement of juror unanimity in criminal
cases and eliminate much of the present doctrinal confusion and potential
unfairness.
Part III of this Article provides a study of United States v. Thompson, a recent
case that illustrates the unfortunate yet predictable result of overreaching and
misapplication of current aiding and abetting doctrines.10 Thompson serves as an
8. The most common example of a one-defendant trial concerning multiparty criminality is an
indictment charging more than one defendant, but all of the defendants, except one, pled guilty prior
to trial. See CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 4.02 (4th ed. 1993)
[hereinafter D.C. RED BOOK]. The D.C. Red Book provides in bracketed language, "It is not necessary
that all the people who committed the crime be caught or identified." Id. The accompanying
commentary states that this instruction "should be given in cases in which the principal offender is not
on trial with the defendant." Id. at 4.02 cmt.
9. See, e.g., Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process:
Making the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL L. REv. 1423 (2001) (arguing that the
prosecution's use of irreconcilable theories at separate proceedings violates defendants' due process
rights); Peter A. Joy & KevinC. McMunigal, Should Prosecutors Use InconsistentArguments?, CRIM.
JUST., Winter 2005, at 47 (asserting that prosecutors should generally refrain from pursuing
inconsistent theories of guilt).
10. 279 F.3d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 904 (2002). In the interest of full
disclosure, the author served as appellate counsel for the defendant and as counsel of record for the
unsuccessful filing of the petition for writ of certiorari.
[Vol. 57: 85
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object lesson and a catalyst for the necessary doctrinal reevaluation and refinement.
Part IV offers the conclusion that a reinvigorated and more concrete unanimity
requirement when the prosecution seeks to prove criminal liability as an aider and
abettor comports with contemporary notions of due process. This modest proposed
doctrinal adjustment represents a positive development for federal criminal law in
the twenty-first century.
II. THE PROBLEMS WITH FEDERAL AIDING AND ABEfING DOCTRINE
The federal aiding and abetting statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), provides, "Whoever
commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands,
induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal."" This statute,
enacted in its original form in 1909, reflects the modem view that an aider and
abettor is punishable as a principal. The statute constituted a rejection of the old
common law rules for felonies, where, among other things, the guilt of the
accessory depended on the established guilt of the principal offender. 2
Under the modem statutory formulation embodied in § 2(a), the principal is the
principal offender, a term long understood to refer to the person who physically
commits the offense. 3 In application, § 2(a) does not mean that the aider and abettor
is the principal. Despite the general observation that modem federal aiding and
abetting doctrine maintains no distinction between the principal and the aider and
abettor and despite the Supreme Court's inartful pronouncement that "[w]ith the
enactment of[ 18 U.S.C. § 2], all participants in conduct violating a federal criminal
II. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000). In 1909, Congress enacted this aiding and abetting statute intending
to revamp early Anglo-American accomplice law, which "was intricate and frequently illogical."
Joshua Dressier, Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings ofAccomplice Liability: New Solutions
to an Old Problem, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 94 (1985). At common law, parties to a crime were divided
into four discrete categories. These categories were largely created to mitigate the harshness of a felony
conviction, which often resulted in a death sentence. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15
(1980) (providing citations to sources discussing common law principles concerning principals and
accessories). Federal aiding and abetting doctrine has been a part of federal criminal law since the first
federal criminal code of 1790. Act of Apr. 30, 1790, § 2, 1 Stat. 112 (1790). However, aiding and
abetting liability was separately set forth in individual statutes and was governed by the then-applicable
limits and procedures of common law. See, e.g., id. § 10, 1 Stat. at 114 (separating liability for
accessories before the fact for crimes of murder, robbery, or piracies from liability for other crimes).
18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000) discusses the "causer": an individual who acts through an innocent
instrumentality and is thus a principal. Congress added this provision to the Federal Criminal Code in
1948. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 684. The § 2(b) "causer" is analytically different from
the aider and abettor, in that the latter shares the criminal culpability with the principal actor. See infra
notes 107-11 and accompanying text.
12. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15-20.
13. See id. at 15-18; WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *34; 1 MATrHEW HALE, THE
HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 233 (photo. reprint 1971) (1736).
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statute are 'principals,"" 4 the concept of an aider and abettor is not blithely
interchangeable with the concept of a principal.
This observation is significant. Congress added the present "punishable as a
principal" language to the federal aiding and abetting statute in 1951, replacing the
original 1909 "is a principal" language to "eliminate all doubt that in the cases of
offenses whose prohibition is directed at members of specified classes.., a person
who is not himself a member of that class may nonetheless be punished as a
principal if he induces a person in that class to violate the prohibition."'" This was
a pro-prosecution amendment, which eliminated the defense argument that an
individual could not be guilty as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2 when he lacked the
capacity to commit the actual offense. The subtle but substantial modification of the
statutory language underscored the point that the concept of an aider and abettor
was not synonymous with the concept of a principal.
Thus, it is ironic when present-day prosecutors too often proceed as if it does
not matter whether they convict a particular defendant as a principal or as an aider
and abettor.' This common prosecutorial attitude is not surprising if courts
regularly, but nonetheless improperly, treat the terms as synonymous in all respects.
This attitude can also be explained if one misconstrues the proper contours of the
"no distinction" rule and only focuses on the narrow concept that the aider and
abettor is punishable as a principal.
Many of these problems are inherent in modem federal aiding and abetting
instructions. The Ninth Circuit's model criminal aiding and abetting instruction is
representative of instructions routinely given in federal district courts throughout
the nation. The instruction provides:
[1] A defendant may be found guilty of [crime charged1, even if
the defendant personally did not commit the act or acts
14. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 20. Standefer actually resolved a separate disputed issue unrelated to
whether the principal is indistinguishable from the aider and abettor. Standefer resolved a circuit split
and held that the conviction of the principal is not essential for a conviction of the aider and abettor.
Id. The Court's similar pronouncement in Nye & Nissen v. United States that aiding and abetting
"makes a defendant a principal when he consciously shares in any criminal act," 336 U.S. 613, 620
(1949) (emphasis added), is not nearly as egregious because the Court decided the case in 1949 when
the pertinent statutory language read "is liable as a principal," § 2, 62 Stat. at 684, and was decided
prior to the 1951 amendment, which substituted the present language, Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655,
65 Stat. 717. The language in Nye & Nissen is still confusing, however, because courts today often cite
the case as authority supporting the current aiding and abetting instruction. See I LEONARD B. SAND
ET AL, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS---CRIMINAL 11.01, at 11-4 to -7 (2005).
15. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 18-19 n.l 1 (citation omitted).
16. See, e.g, United States v. Moye, 422 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2005). In Moye, the government
argued that "because aiding and abetting is implicit in all indictments" the district court properly
instructed the jury on that charge. Id. at 214. In a 2-1 decision, the Fourth Circuit reversed the
conviction on one count because no evidence supported the aiding and abetting instruction. Id. at
213-15. The dissenting judge argued for the more common outcome: that the conviction should be
upheld based on the harmless error doctrine. Id. at 217-21 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 57: 85
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constituting the crime but aided and abetted in its
commission. To prove a defendant guilty of aiding and
abetting, the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt:
[2] First, [crime charged] was committed by someone;
[3] Second, the defendant knowingly and intentionally aided,
counseled, commanded, induced or procured that person to
commit [crime charged];17 and
[4] Third, the defendant acted before the crime was completed.
[5] It is not enough that the defendant merely associated with the
person committing the crime, or unknowingly or
unintentionally did things that were helpful to that person, or
was present at the scene of the crime.
[6] The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted with the knowledge and intention of helping
that person commit the [crime charged].
[7] The government is not required to prove precisely which
defendant actually committed the crime and which defendant
aided and abetted.'8
Similarly, the authoritative Sand and Siffert, Modern Federal Jury
Instructions-Criminal, provides the following aiding and abetting instruction in
relevant part:
Under the aiding and abetting statute, it is not necessary for
the government to show that a defendant himself physically
committed the crime with which he is charged in order for the
government to sustain its burden of proof. A person who aids or
abets another to commit an offense is just as guilty of that offense
as if he committed it himself.
Accordingly, you may find a defendant guilty of the offense
charged if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
government has proven that another person actually committed the
offense with which the defendant is charged, and that the
17. As will be discussed later, for this instruction to be appropriate as to a particular defendant,
the "someone" referred to in the second paragraph is a person other than the defendant, and the
defendant referred to in the third paragraph is different firom "that person," who is the "someone" other
than the defendant. While this observation may seem self-evident, failure to strictly adhere to this
differentiation may create a situation where a defendant faces an aiding and abetting instruction when
there is no evidence that another party actually committed the offense.
18. COMM. ON MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS WITHIN THE NINTH CIRCUIT, MANUAL OF MODEL
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT 5.1 (2003 ed.)
[hereinafter NINTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS] (brackets in original).
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defendant aided or abetted that person in the commission of the
offense.
As you can see, the first requirement is that you find that
another person has committed the crime charged. Obviously, no
one can be convicted of aiding or abetting the criminal acts of
another if no crime was committed by the other person in the first
place. 9
Lastly, the Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, commonly
referred to as the Red Book,2" provides model jury instructions often used in federal
criminal trials in the District of Columbia.2' Instruction 4.02, the pertinent aiding
and abetting instruction, provides:
You may find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in the
indictment without finding that s/he personally committed each of
the acts that make up the crime or that s/he was present while the
crime was being committed. Any person who in some way
intentionally participates in the commission of a crime aids and
abets the principal offender. S/he therefore is as guilty of the
crime as s/he would be if s/he had personally committed each of
the acts that make up the crime.
To find that the defendant aided and abetted in committing a
crime, you must find that the defendant knowingly associated
herself/himself with the person(s) who committed the crime, that
s/he participated in the crime as something that s/he wished to
bring about, and that s/he intended by her/his actions to make it
succeed.
[It is not necessary that all the people who committed the
crime be caught or identified.]
It is sufficient if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the
crime was committed by someone and that the defendant
knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principal
offender[s] in committing the crime.22
Model jury instructions themselves often perpetuate confusion. Of the three
model instructions disclosed above, only the Ninth Circuit's instruction includes the
19. SANDET AL, supranote 14, 11.01, at 11-4.
20. D.C. RED BOOK, supra note 8.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 233 F.3d 619, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing a Red Book
instruction); United States v. Washington, 106 F.3d 983,992 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same).
22. D.C. RED BOOK, supra note 8, 4.02 (brackets in original).
[Vol. 57: 85
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statute's command or induce term. The other two model instructions do not set forth
or otherwise expressly address the command or induce concept
23
Also, only the District of Columbia's RedBook instruction specifically uses the
traditional common law term "principal offender." '24 However, all three formulations
clearly embody that concept. Sand and Siffert refer to the person who "physically
committed the crime." Similarly, the Ninth Circuit's model instruction refers to the
person who "personally ... commit[ted] the act or acts constituting the crime"
charged.26 Thus, all three formulations distinguish the primary actor from the aider
and abettor.2" This distinction reinforces the notion that the principal is not
synonymous or interchangeable with the aider and abettor.
Under all three model instructions, to convict an individual using an aiding and
abetting theory, the evidence must establish, either alternatively or independently,
that the aider and abettor assisted a principal offender in committing the completed
offense.2" As used in this context, the principal offender is the one who physically
commits all the elements of the offense. Amplifying these general principles,
several interpretive principles have developed, all of which are favorable to the
prosecution.
Generally, the following principles are fair and reasonable when properly
applied. However, given the lax manner in which prosecutors can utilize aiding and
23. In an effort to make the instruction more understandable, the Red Book commentary states
that the "command and induce" language "has been eliminated in favor of 'intentionally participates"'
but recognizes that "[i]n some cases, the facts will call for use of a more precise term ... and the
Committee recommends use of the appropriate term in those cases. For example, where the aider and
abettor orders the criminal act, the judge should use 'command.' D.C. RED BOOK, supra note 8, 4.02
cmt. Cf United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (stating that, under the
circumstances, the commander who did not physically commit the offense could be the principal), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 904 (2002). See Part m for a critique of Thompson.
24. The Supreme Court in Standefer noted that Congress enacted an aiding and abetting statute
in 1901 which referred to the "principal offender" to abrogate the common law for the District of
Columbia, and that statute is still in force today. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 18 & n.10
(1980) (citing Act of Mar. 3, 1901, ch. 854, § 908, 31 Stat. 1337 (now codified as amended at D.C.
CODEANN. § 22-1805 (Lexis Nexis 2001))). The RedBook instruction originates from that statute. See
D.C. RED BOOK, supra note 8, 4.02.
25. SAND ET AL., supra note 14, 11.01, at 11-4.
26. NINTH CIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, 5.1.
27. Likewise, the pertinent Fifth Circuit pattern instruction for aiding and abetting does not refer
to a principal offender, but instead refers to agency principles to distinguish the aider and abettor from
"some [other] person" that thejury finds beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed "every element
of the offense." COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL CASES 2.06 (2001 ed.).
28. An individual can also aid and abet an attempted offense if substantive federal law
criminalizes the attempted offense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1113 (2000) (criminalizing attempted murder
or manslaughter); 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (2000) (proscribing bank robbery and attempted bank robbery);
see also United States v. Samuels, 308 F.3d 662, 666-68 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing aiding and
abetting in the context of an attempt to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine). No general federal
attempt statute exists. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 (1962) (providing a general criminal attempt
statute).
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abetting theory, the principles can be overdrawn and extended to impermissible
situations. Giving an aiding and abetting instruction in those impermissible
situations is unwarranted and should constitute reversible error.
The general danger of a jury's receipt of an improper aiding and abetting
instruction must be recognized. An improper instruction, when unsupported by the
evidence, may direct a jury to convict a defendant even if it is not clear that the
defendant possessed the requisite intent. This problem arises because aiding and
abetting instructions specifically provide criminal liability where the defendant did
not actually commit all elements of the offense and where the aider and abettor's
actions, in the abstract, may be wholly innocent. For example, if a defendant
concedes that he committed all of the crime's physical acts (and would thus seem
to be the principal), contesting only intent, the jury may misinterpret the aiding and
abetting instruction as providing for guilt even where one element-the mental
element-is not proven. The prosecution finds aiding and abetting liability attractive
because, like conspiracy liability, its expansive nature permits aiding and abetting
liability to be established upon a finding that the defendant did not actually commit
all elements of the offense. However, precisely because of its potentially broad
sweep, aider and abettor liability's utility must be carefully scrutinized.
To guard against the danger of abuse, federal courts have imposed various
procedural safeguards to protect against indiscriminate and improper use of
conspiracy instructions.29 Despite similar potential for abuse, no comparable
concern regarding the use of aiding and abetting instructions exists.
As noted above, modem federal complicity doctrines eliminated most, but not
all, of the legal distinctions between a principal and an aider and abettor. This
development has led to the somewhat sloppy and overly broad notion of the no
distinction rule.
Many current aiding and abetting doctrines reflect the proper application of the
no distinction rule. First, under federal law, an aiding and abetting theory is implied
in every charge. This pro-prosecution principle permits the government to receive
an aiding and abetting instruction and to argue for conviction under that theory even
without specifically alleging 18 U.S.C. § 2 in the indictment.0
29. See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-81 (1987) (discussing requirements
for admitting a co-conspirator's out-of-court statement under the Federal Rules of Evidence); see also
United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582 (5th Cir. 1979) (observing that the district court should
generally require a "showing of a conspiracy" before admitting a co-conspirator's declarations but
noting that "the court may admit the statement subject to being connected up" in certain circumstances);
United States v. Paredes, 176 F. Supp. 2d 183, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (allowing admission of a co-
conspirator's statement before proving a conspiracy although the government must ultimately prove its
existence or risk mistrial).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Vaandering, 50 F.3d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that "the
district court did not err in failing expressly to connect the aiding and abetting instruction to a specific
count... of the indictment"); United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir. 1984) (providing
the rule that an "aiding and abetting charge. . . 'need not be specifically pleaded and a defendant
indicted for a substantive offense can be convicted as an aider and abettor' upon a proper demonstration
of proof so long as no unfair surprise results" (quoting United States v. Tucker, 552 F.2d 202,204 (7th
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Notwithstanding the no distinction rule, aiding and abetting doctrine is
generally accepted without much controversy, even when aggressively applied.
Related legal theories of accessorial criminal liability that are favorable to the
government, particularly conspiracy law, do not ordinarily receive such lenient
treatment.3"
Although an aiding and abetting theory may be implied in every charge, an
aiding and abetting instruction is not proper in every case of multi-party criminality.
Proper application of aiding and abetting theory means the judge may give the
instruction if the instruction is supported by the evidence, even when the indictment
does not allege aiding and abetting liability.32
The above-stated principle demonstrates long-established hombook federal
criminal law. Nonetheless, its application invokes significant due process and fair
notice issues, which courts should consider when applying aiding and abetting
principles.33 A competent federal defense lawyer must know that every charge
implies an aiding and abetting theory. A defense attorney would be remiss if she
went to trial on an indictment that made no reference to § 2 and then argued for
dismissal or acquittal on the ground that the indictment failed to allege an offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 2 if the prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant aided
and abetted someone else in the commission of the charged offense.
The practical fairness rationale for such a rule is evident: a trial is not a game.
Many situations warrant an aiding and abetting instruction when sufficient evidence
exists to support a finding that the defendant was the principal offender and
sufficient, albeit conflicting, evidence also exists to support a finding that the same
defendant was an aider and abettor and someone other than the defendant was the
principal offender. If indicted as a principal, a defendant should not be able to
exploit what is in effect a musical chairs defense by arguing for acquittal on the
Cir. 1977))). Under current doctrine, due process may prevent giving an aiding and abetting instruction
if the defendant can establish unfair surprise. However, unfair surprise is exceedingly difficult to
establish. SAND ET AL, supra note 14, 11.01, at 11-3 (citing cases uniformly rejecting unfair surprise
claims). Similar due process and fair notice concepts underlie the Model Penal Code's consolidated
theft provisions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(1) (1976).
31. For example, criminal liability under the Pinkerton doctrine can be upheld only if a Pinkerton
instruction was actually given to the jury. See Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618
(1949); United States v. Spudic, 795 F.2d 1334, 1339 (7th Cir. 1986).
32. See supra note 30. The judge must also tailor the instruction to each particular defendant. For
example, suppose an indictment charges A and B together, and all of the evidence establishes thatA was
the principal offender and B was the aider and abettor. Then, if B pleads guilty and A stands trial alone,
an aiding and abetting instruction would be inappropriate at A's trial, despite evidence of joint
participation. See United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1408 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Brooks v. United
States, 599 A.2d 1094, 1100-03 (D.C. 1991).
33. Sand and Siffert note, "The courts are agreed that an aiding and abetting instruction is not
appropriate when it unfairly surprises the defendant, although that standard appears to be
extraordinarily difficult to satisfy." SAND ETAL.,supra note 14, 11.01, at 11-3; see also United States
v. Moye, 422 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding an aiding and abetting instruction on felon in
possession of a firearm charge improper where no evidence was presented that alleged principal
offender).
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grounds that the evidence establishes that he was an aider and abettor, or vice
versa.
3 4
Second, the seventh paragraph of the Ninth Circuit's aiding and abetting
instruction reflects the related legal principle that the government does not have to
prove precisely who was the principal and who was the aider and abettor.3 Properly
applied in a limited context, this legal principle is also unobjectionable. For
example, this rule is applicable when some evidence suggests that a particular
defendant was the principal offender but other evidence suggests that the same
defendant was an aider and abettor. This rule is sensible because, as noted above,
two defendants could otherwise defend on the grounds that the one charged as the
aider and abettor is not guilty because he was the principal, while the one charged
as the principal is not guilty because he was the aider and abettor. Again, this
general rule is sound if the evidence supports that both defendants could have been
either the principal or the aider and abettor. The law should not permit a defendant
to escape liability under a musical chairs or shell game theory based on lack of
proof.
316
34. See generally Commonwealth v. Ryan, 30 N.E. 364 (Mass. 1892) (affirming defendant's
embezzlement conviction, rejecting his argument that the evidence established larceny).
35. See NINTHCIRCUIT INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 18, 5.1. Compare this language with Red Book
Instruction 4.02, which provides in the penultimate paragraph that "[i]t is not necessary that all the
people who committed the crime be caught or identified." D.C. RED BOOK, supra note 8, 4.02.
However, the relevant commentary states that this language should be given (in a case against an aider
and abettor) when "the principal offender is not on trial with [defendant]" aider and abettor. Id. Thus,
the Red Book instruction and comment serve to implicitly limit the flexibility and alternatives set forth
in this paragraph and support the proposition that the instruction should not be given in a single-
defendant case when the principal offender is not on trial with the aider and abettor. For a
misapplication of this instruction, see infra Part Ill for an analysis of Thompson.
36. A classic example is when two assailants viciously attack a victim with a knife but only one
assailant actually administers the single, fatal blow. It would be ludicrous in such a situation to permit
acquittal of both defendants because of the uncertainty surrounding which assailant actually
administered the fatal blow. See United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 544-45 (4th Cir. 1990). This
"uncertainty" principle is also useful in drug and gun possession cases, where, coupled with
constructive possession principles, a gun found in a glove compartment may be attributed to persons
in the car. Cf United States v. Shephard, 439 F.2d 1392 (1 st Cir. 1971) (rejecting defendant's argument
that the jury could not determine he was in possession of a firearm beyond a reasonable doubt when it
may have belonged to other passengers in the car); see also Bayer v. United States, 651 A.2d 308 (D.C.
1994) (holding when the government proceeds against defendant as principal but then, at close of
evidence, successfully requests aiding and abetting instruction, no reversal is warranted where there is
sufficient evidence that the defendant was present and participating in the crime). This principle is
conceptually far more problematic when the aiding and abetting evidence is removed from the actual
commission of the offense. For example, in an arson prosecution, where one defendant purchases the
gasoline and the other douses the house with gasoline, it is difficult to conclude that it does not matter
which defendant did what and permit the jury to convict without a unanimous decision as to which
defendant provided the gasoline and which defendant started the fire. In this scenario, the gasoline's
purchaser performed an act that was wholly innocent in the abstract; thus, allowing the patchwork
mixing and matching of principal and aiding and abetting theories may impermissibly reduce the
government's burden of proof on the intent issue. See generally James J. McGuire, Note, Schad v.
Arizona: Diminishing the Need for Verdict Specificity, 70 N.C. L. REv. 936 (1992) (lamenting the
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However, this rule should not apply in all cases. The rule should only apply in
situations, such as a homicide prosecution, where two assailants are present at the
scene, but the evidence does not conclusively prove which attacker actually
administered the fatal blow. In this context, both actors are, in effect, principals;
37
it is not necessary to require the government to establish the precise roles of each
defendant. This concept is fair, sensible, and easily understood. That conclusion,
however, does not hinge on aiding and abetting doctrine and does not directly
address whether the jury must unanimously agree on one of the alternate theories.
The Ninth Circuit's instruction reflects another, more troublesome dimension
of current aiding and abetting doctrine. As presently applied, the instruction permits
a guilty verdict if, for example, six jurors conclude that the defendant was the
principal offender and six conclude that he was the aider and abettor (thereby
determining that someone else actually committed the offense).3" That principle
seems to apply even if the acts of aiding and abetting are far removed in space and
time from the actual commission of the offense and is thus outside the musical
chairs or shell game scenario ofjoint participants discussed above.39 This situation
requires a different rule and may necessitate reimposition of the old common law
category of accessory before the fact.4' The current practice of permitting a
conviction where the jury is not unanimous on whether the defendant is a principal
reduced importance of the juror unanimity requirement).
37. See supra note 36. At common law, this scenario would not implicate aiding and abetting or
accessorial concepts-both actors would be principals in the first degree. See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA,
WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 30, at 185 (15th ed. 1993) ("Where two persons engage in criminal
conduct together, as where they participate in striking and killing another, each participant is a principal
in the first degree in the homicide.").
38. See Horton, 921 F.2d at 545; United States v. Eagle Elk, 820 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1985); Greer v. United States, 600 A.2d 1086, 1088
n.4 (D.C. 1991); Tyler v. United States, 495 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C. 1985); see also United States v.
Harris, 8 F.3d 943,945 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the judge does not need to instruct the jurors that
they must unanimously determine whether the defendant is an aider and abettor or a principal); see
generally Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Requirement of Jury Unanimity as to Mode of Committing
Crime Under Statute Setting Forth the Various Modes by Which Offense May be Committed, 75
A.L.R. 4th 91 (1990) (discussing cases where juries do not have to unanimously agree on how the
defendant violated a criminal statute).
Under federal law, it is immaterial in an aider or abettor's trial if the principal was acquitted in
another proceeding, before a different jury. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 n. 16
("Nothing in the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause forecloses putting petitioner on
trial as an aider and abettor simply because another jury has determined that his principal was not guilty
of the offenses charged." (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)). In some jurisdictions, if the
jury acquits the principal, the jury may not convict the aider and abettor in the same trial. See Donald
M. Zupanec, Annotation, Acquittal of Principal, or His Conviction of Lesser Degree of Offense, as
Affecting Prosecution of Accessory, or Aider and Abettor, 9 A.L.R. 4th 972 (1981).
39. See supra note 36. The rule should not apply in a prosecution where certain evidence shows
one defendant provided the materials while other evidence shows the same defendant actually started
the fire.
40. See TORCIA, supra note 37, § 32, at 193 ("At common law, an accessory before the fact is
a person who aids, abets, procures, commands, counsels, or otherwise encourages another to commit
a crime, but is not present when the crime is committed.").
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or an aider and abettor raises significant due process, verdict specificity, and jury
unanimity concerns."'
Surprisingly, there have been relatively few constitutional challenges to the
validity of this patchwork theory of guilt. For almost a century, federal courts,
without adequate legal and historical analysis, have simply viewed the elimination
of the distinctions between a principal and an aider and abettor as also dispensing
the need for jury unanimity in virtually all cases. As one recent commentator
summarized, under longstanding doctrine, "A jury may convict, even if some jurors
determine that the defendant is a principal, and others determine that he or she is an
aider and abettor."'42 Significantly, the few courts that have addressed the issue, even
tangentially, do not analytically distinguish between the two following fact patterns:
(1) where conflicting evidence exists as to the identity of a principal and an aider
and abettor when all parties were present at the crime's commission, and (2) where
an aider and abettor allegedly provided assistance but was not present at the crime's
commission.43 The former scenario involves two principals at common law, whereas
the latter involves a common law accessory before the fact.
The leading case standing for the proposition that the jury does not need to
unanimously agree on the identities of the principal and the aider and abettor is
United States v. Horton." However, Horton involved the classic two-principal
situation where two persons actively participated in a fatal assault.4 5 Accordingly,
41. Due process requires that the prosecution prove every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970). The Supreme Court has determined
that the Due Process Clause prevents legislatures from defining particular offenses too broadly but
permits some flexibility in both defining alternative routes to satisfy an element and prescribing
alternative factual courses of conduct that do not require unanimity. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S.
624,634-35 (1991) (rejecting the Sixth Amendment conceptual groupings analysis endorsed in United
States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977) and United States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.
1987)). See infra notes 71-92, 98-103, 110 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Schad
decision.
42. Weiss, supra note 1, at 1364 & n.103.
43. Virtually all cases involve situations where multiple accomplices are present during the
commission of the offense, and the defense attempts to sow the seeds of confusion by asserting a
purportedly insoluble problem of proof between the multiple actors as to who struck the fatal blow.
Notably, none of these cases involve situations in which common law would have characterized one
of the parties as an accessory before the fact. See infra note 45.
44. 921 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1990).
45. Id. at 544. The cases cited in Horton are of similarly dubious value. Horton cited United
States v. Eagle Elk for the misleading proposition that"' [e]ven if thejury was divided on whether Eagle
Elk committed the principal crime or aided and abetted in its commission, there can be no question that
the illegal act was murder."' Id. at 545 (quoting Eagle Elk, 820 F.2d 959, 961 (8th Cir. 1987)). Eagle
Elk was an appeal from a denial of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Id. at 960. The opinion did not
fully set forth the pertinent facts, but the facts stated in the underlying direct appeal establish that Eagle
Elk admitted he was present and fired the shotgun, although he claimed to have missed. See United
States v. Elk, 658 F.2d 644, 646 (8th Cir. 1981). Thus, Eagle Elk similarly concerns a scenario where
all of the actors were principals, thus implicating the musical chairs scenario where unanimity as to
theory should not be required. Eagle Elk is therefore distinguishable from the true accessory situation
where unanimity as to theory should be required.
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the case did not involve any actor who would have been characterized as an
accessory before the fact at common law. As a result, the court's analysis did not
concern the distinct concept of an aider and abettor or whether one can blithely
interchange culpability as an aider and abettor with culpability as a principal. Thus,
the pertinent legal and historical inquiry is virtually one of first impression.
Nothing in the 1909 act that created modem federal aiding and abetting law
clearly supports the conclusion that juror unanimity as to theory is no longer
required. As noted above, this statute eliminated the arcane common law
distinctions which classified those who offered pre-crime assistance to the
commission of a felony as guilty of a separate crime and whose liability depended
on the principal's established guilt. As the Supreme Court noted in Standefer, the
common law rule of "special relevance" was "the rule that an accessory could not
be convicted without the prior conviction of the principal offender."" The Standefer
Court also recognized that the common law rules were developed to shield
accessories because all parties to a felony were subject to the death penalty at early
common law.47 The prospect of a rampant, indiscriminately applied death penalty
was no longer viable, even at the dawn of the twentieth century. The 1909 federal
enactment, which became 18 U.S.C. § 2, thus reflected a modern policy judgment
that an aider and abettor is as morally blameworthy as the principal and thus
punishable as a principal without regard to the principal's established guilt.4
However, the change did not speak, even indirectly, to the unanimity
requirement. Moreover, under common law rules of pleading for felonies, unanimity
The Horton court also cited United States v. Peterson, 768 F.2d 64 (2d Cir. 1985). In Peterson,
the Second Circuit upheld a narcotics possession conviction by properly applying constructive
possession principles where an undercover officer purchased heroin from two brothers who were acting
in concert and standing next to each other. Id. This situation again implicates the musical chairs
scenario and in reality concerns co-principals, After Horton, the Second Circuit held in United States
v. Harris, 8 F.3d 943, 945 (2d Cir. 1993) that unanimity of theory is not required in a narcotics case
where the prosecution offers evidence that the defendant either attempted or aided and abetted another
in the attempt to possess cocaine. This scenario affects other theories of inchoate criminal liability that
are not controlling here.
46. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15 (1980) (emphasis added) (citing HALE, supra note
13, at 623-24).
47. Id.
48. See S. REP.NO. 59-4825,pt. 1, at 11 (1907). One commentator has summarized this policy
in the following way:
Ordinarily a person is held criminally responsible for his own actions. However,
when an accomplice chooses to become a part of the criminal activity of another,
she says in essence, "your acts are my acts," and forfeits her personal identity. We
euphemistically may impute the actions of the perpetrator to the accomplice by
"agency" doctrine; in reality, we demand that she who chooses to aid in a crime
forfeits her right to be treated as an individual. Thus, moral distinctions between
parties are rendered irrelevant. We pretend the accomplice is no more than an
incorporeal shadow.
Dressler, supra note 11, at I 11.
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as to theory was required with respect to principals and accessories.49 The common
law rules of pleading provided that a jury could convict a defendant charged as a
principal in the first degree upon proof that he was a principal in the second degree.
However, ajury could not convict a defendant charged as a principal if the evidence
established that he was an accessory, and vice versa.50 Wharton's Criminal Law
summarizes the pertinent common law procedures:
At common law, a principal in the second degree could be
tried and convicted before the trial and conviction of the principal
in the first degree; he could even be tried and convicted after the
trial and acquittal of the principal in the first degree. But, in order
to convict the principal in the second degree for aiding and
abetting, the commission of the prohibited act by the principal in
the first degree had to be proved. Although under certain
circumstances the principal in the second degree could be guilty
of a higher or lower degree or grade of crime than the principal in
the first degree, in the ordinary case the principal in the first
degree and the principal in the second degree were treated as
equally guilty and subject to the same punishment.
An accessory before or after the fact could not be tried before
the principal. Indeed, a conviction of the principal was a
prerequisite to a conviction of the accessory. Although the
principal and accessory could be joined in the same charge and
tried jointly, the jury had to be instructed to inquire first as to the
guilt or innocence of the principal and, only if the principal were
found guilty, could the jury inquire whether or not the accessory
was also guilty. If the principal died, was acquitted, was pardoned,
or was never apprehended, the accessory could not be prosecuted
even though his guilt was clear and easy to prove.
The principal and accessory were treated as equally guilty and
subject to the same punishment, and the accessory could not be
guilty of a higher degree or grade of crime than the principal. A
person charged in an indictment as a principal could not be
convicted on evidence showing that he was merely an accessory;
49. In addition, early common law did not generally permit multiple-count indictments. However,
such joinder did not invalidate the indictment. Instead, the prosecution was compelled to elect the single
charge under which it would proceed. I MARK S. RHODES, ORFIELD'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE UNDER
THE FEDERAL RULES § 8:20, at 665 (2d ed. 1985). Thus, there was no issue of whether a court could
simultaneously try a defendant as an aider and abettor in one count and as a principal in another count.
Multi-count indictments in federal prosecutions became prevalent in the mid-twentieth century.
50. WAYNE R. LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAW § 13.1(d)(2) (4th ed. 2003).
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and, conversely, a person charged as an accessory could not be
convicted on evidence showing that he was a principal.51
Moreover, as the Supreme Court noted in Standefer, at common law a jury
could not convict an accessory in felony cases without first convicting the principal
offender.52 Since the principal offender's prior conviction was a prerequisite to the
prosecution of the alleged aider and abettor, it was a procedural impossibility for the
prosecution to proceed against a felony defendant by using alternative theories (one
as principal and one as accessory), let alone obtain a conviction where the jury was
divided on whether the defendant was a principal or an aider and abettor.5 3
Congress unquestionably intended the 1909 enactment of the federal aiding and
abetting statute to eliminate the common law rules and distinctions concerning
parties to a crime. 54 However, nothing in the statute or in the legislative history
suggests that Congress's rejection of the common law rules also meant to eliminate
the unanimity of theory principle, which rested on a distinct, coie constitutional
obligation to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, the clear import of
the 1909 enactment was to make felony and misdemeanor prosecutions procedurally
similar to the extent that "all participants were deemed principals, [and] a prior
acquittal of the actual perpetrator did not prevent the subsequent conviction of a
person who rendered assistance.""5
The genesis of the modem federal aiding and abetting statute can be traced to
a mid-nineteenth century act of Parliament that, as interpreted, "permitted an
accessory to be convicted 'although the principal be acquitted."' 56 Parliament's
1848 act was the model for Congress's enactment of a similar provision of local
applicability for the District of Columbia, which in turn served as the basic model
for the 1909 federal aiding and abetting statute.57
The Standefer Court succinctly observed, "[The] clear intent [was] to permit the
conviction of accessories to federal criminal offenses despite the prior acquittal of
the actual perpetrator of the offense. It gives general effect to what had always been
the rule for second-degree principals and for all misdemeanants." However,
whether common law misdemeanor prosecutions permitted pursuit of alternative
51. TORCIA, supra note 37, § 34, at 199-202 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
52. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15.
53. The prosecution could use alternative theories to the extent it sought to establish that a person
was actually or '"constructively present' so as to be a second degree principal." Id. at 16 (citing
BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *34). However, this avenue of liability only covers a small category
of actors liable under § 2(a). Section 2(a) also encompasses a large category of actors that could have
only been characterized as accessories before the fact at common law and those who aided and abetted
or induced the crime but were not in physical proximity to the crime at the time of its commission.
54. See supra notes I 1-15 and accompanying text.
55. Standefer, 447 U.S. at 16.
56. Id. (quoting Regina v. Hughes, 169 Eng. Rep. 1245, 1248 (Q.B. 1860)).
57. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 16-18 & n.10 (1980).
58. Id. at 19.
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theories, and more specifically, whether a conviction could be supported by multiple
theories, thereby not requiring juror unanimity as to the identity of the principal or
the aider and abettor, was never uniformly or clearly established.
At early common law, an individual could not be convicted as an aider and
abettor if charged with a felony as a principal. As a corollary, the law required the
accessory's guilt to be based on the established guilt of the principal. As noted
above, these limitations largely developed to limit the applicability of capital
punishment as a penalty.
Early common law treated misdemeanors differently than felonies.
Misdemeanants were not subject to the death penalty. Rules to distinguish a
principal from an aider and abettor in misdemeanor prosecutions were therefore
unnecessary in order to limit the imposition of the death penalty. The penalties for
misdemeanors were relatively small, so an elaborate, graduated culpability scheme
was not required because there was no substantial concern that a purported aider
and abettor whose objective conduct appeared innocent may actually be innocent,
yet put to death. Accordingly, the general principle that all parties to a misdemeanor
were of equal culpability and were all considered principals was logical and fair.
The blackletter common law for misdemeanors hence drew no distinction between
a principal and an aider and abettor.59
However, what this principle meant and how far it extended is ambiguous. Clearly,
the accessory's guilt could be established without first establishing the guilt of the
principal. But even if courts construed this principle to mean that a defendant could be
charged as a principal but convicted on proof that he was an aider and abettor (or vice
versa), it did not necessarily follow that jury unanimity whether the defendant was a
principal or an aider and abettor was not required. The prosecution commonly identified
the parties as principals or as accessories first and then proceeded under one consistent
theory, thus requiring unanimity as to a specific theory for a conviction.6"
In most reported misdemeanor prosecutions, the indictment charged the
defendant as a principal, and then the prosecution chose to pursue one consistent
59. BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *36.
60. The Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue. In Standefer, the Court cited the
general common law rule that"all parties to a misdemeanor, whatever their roles, were principals." 447
U.S. at 15. However, as noted above, Standefer did not address, in neither its opinion nor dicta, the
unanimity of theory requirement.
Also, the cases cited by the Standefer court do not address this issue either. United States v.
Hartwell, 26 F. Cas. 196 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 15,318), states the general common law rule, but
the government's exclusive theory in that case was that the defendants were "confederates" of the
principal. Id. at 199. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943), involved corporate criminality
and strict liability, and the Court simply noted that "the historic conception of a 'misdemeanor' makes
all those responsible for it equally guilty." Id. at 281 (citing United States v. Mills, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 138,
141 (1833)). Mills similarly states the misdemeanor general common law rule, but the government's
allegations and evidence was exclusively based on the single theory that the defendant advised,
procured, and assisted the principal to commit the offense. 32 U.S. at 140-41. The Standefer court also
cited Blackstone, who stated the common law misdemeanor rule without discussing whether unanimity
of theory was required. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 15 (citing BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *33).
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evidentiary theory that the defendant was either a principal or an aider and abettor.
As such, courts often confronted the issue of whether a defendant charged as a
principal could be convicted as an aider and abettor.61 The common law rule for
misdemeanors, unlike felonies, permitted this approach. However, even
misdemeanors did not allow the jury to be divided on whether the defendant was a
principal or an aider and abettor.62 On the contrary, most cases implied that, even
in misdemeanor cases, courts required unanimity of theory, or verdict specificity.63
61. See Rollin M. Perkins, Parties to a Crime, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 581 (1941). Standefer cites to
this article, which is authored by a famous law professor. See 447 U.S. at 15. The article cites but does
not discuss several of the misdemeanor cases that are most directly on point. See Perkins, supra, at 586
& n.31, 593 & n.97.
Stone v. State, 112 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Crim. App. 1937), is representative of such a case. In Stone,
the defendant was charged as a principal for the misdemeanor assault of a school teacher, but all of the
evidence established that the defendant only aided and abetted his wife in the assault. The court
instructed the jury on both principal and aider and abettor theories, but the instruction implied that
unanimity beyond a reasonable doubt as to either theory was required. The defendant appealed his
conviction solely on the ground that he was indicted as a principal but convicted on variant proof that
he aided and abetted his wife in committing the offense. The court of appeals upheld the conviction,
citing the common law rule for misdemeanors that all parties are principals. Id. at 465-66. The case
does not support the proposition that a conviction will be upheld even if the jury was split on whether
the defendant was a principal or aider and abettor.
In State v. Garzio, 175 A. 98 (N.J. 1934), the defendant was indicted for unlawfully and willfully
burning a building. In that case, there was uncontroverted evidence that established the defendant was
not physically present at time of the explosion and that he only supplied the materials for the explosion.
Regardless, the defendant was convicted and the court later upheld his conviction by citing the general
rule that all parties to a misdemeanor are properly charged as principals. Id. at 99-100. See also
Commonwealth v. Jaffas, 188 N.E. 263, 264 (Mass. 1933) (restating the common law rule for
misdemeanors and upholding the defendants' misdemeanor convictions despite the indictment's failure
to allege they were principals).
62. See supra note 61. However, some old misdemeanor cases may be read to support the
proposition that it was not necessary for the jury to be unanimous as to theory. See, e.g., Kemp v. State,
6 S.E.2d 196, 197 (Ga. Ct. App. 1939) (providing the rule that a "'defendant accused... of having
committed [a] misdemeanor may be convicted by proof either that he directly and personally enacted
the criminal transaction, or that he procured, counseled, commanded, aided, or abetted the criminal
transaction as to another, who was the direct and immediate actor"' but furnishing no discussion on
whether alternative theories require jury unanimity (quoting Loeb v. State, 64 S.E. 338 (Ga. Ct. App.
1909))).
In Cole v. State, 166 So. 58 (Ala. Ct. App. 1936), the defendant was tried separately for his
participation in a joint assault. There was conflicting evidence on who shot, pistol whipped, and held
the victim. Id. at 59. The court of appeals described the evidence as being "in sharp conflict." Id. The
defendant was convicted and the court later upheld the conviction by citing the common law rule that
all persons criminally concerned in the commission of a misdemeanor are principals. Id. However, Cole
concerned the musical chairs scenario where there is a question of who, among all defendants present
at the scene, inflicted the fatal blow. In other words, Cole did not involve a situation where, had the
charge been a felony, there would have been accessories before the fact.
In any event, the practice of permitting convictions in misdemeanor cases when the jury was not
unanimous on whether the defendant was a principal or an aider and abettor was far from clear or
uniform, and no misdemeanor case directly holds that a split of theory could be maintained where the
aider and abettor was not physically present and thus an accessory before the fact at common law.
63. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
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Historical practice has simply uncritically assumed this change, thus permitting
federal felony prosecutions to proceed to convictions without requiring jury
unanimity of theory on whether a particular defendant was a principal or an aider
and abettor. However, as noted above, the common law was not clear or uniform
that an individual charged with a misdemeanor could be prosecuted or convicted in
this manner. Thus, allowing this approach in present-day felony prosecutions, at
least in the context of defendants who would have been accessories before the fact
at common law, is therefore questionable.
That courts have accepted this practice for almost a century does not make this
practice immune from present-day challenge. Today, verdict specificity is largely
and somewhat controversially viewed as a due process inquiry into the
government's obligation to establish every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt and whether not requiring specificity as to means offends
fundamental principles of justice."
The Supreme Court has held that historical inquiry is central in determining the
constitutionality of a particular criminal procedure practice.65 Most prominently, in
United States v. Gaudin, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution requires a
jury to decide the issue of materiality.66 For decades, federal courts often construed
64. With respect to the due process requirement that the prosecution unanimously establish every
element beyond a reasonable doubt, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) and Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3 1(a). With respect to due process measured by fundamental fairness, see Schad
v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 642 (1991). For a critique of the Schad decision, where the Court upheld the
defendant's conviction despite uncertainty as to whether the jury was unanimous regarding the theory
of conviction, see McGuire, supra note 36.
65. The few cases addressing the constitutional dimension of this issue involved assaults by
multiple actors where the court was satisfied that the alternative acts, the fatal and non-fatal blows,
were sufficiently similar to avoid violating the unanimity requirement See, e.g., United States v.
Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 545-46 (4th Cir. 1990) ("[A] reviewing court can conclude with confidence that
the verdict represented the unanimous view of the jurors that [the defendant's] role in [the victim's]
murder was, at a minimum, that of an active and knowing participant."). As such, those cases did not
address the scenario where the government presents evidence both that a defendant was the principal
offender and that he was what would have constituted an accessory before the fact at common law.
Even the Horton court left open the possibility that a unanimity instruction might be required where
"the theories of guilt are substantially different." Id. at 546 n.2. But it did not undertake any historical
analysis concerning whether alternate theories of guilt were permitted in misdemeanor cases at common
law. Moreover, these cases that somewhat addressed the constitutional dimension of this issue all
preceded Schad, 501 U.S. 624. For a discussion of other related cases, see supra notes 34-44 and
accompanying text. For an excellent discussion concerning the constitutional limits ofjury fact-finding
and factual divergence in criminal cases, see Scott W. Howe, Jury Fact-Finding in Criminal Cases:
Constitutional Limits on Factual Disagreements Among Convicting Jurors, 58 MO. L. REv. 1 (1993).
Professor Howe concluded that all of the Justices in Schad "obscured the underlying [constitutional]
interests implicated by factual nonconcurrence claims" and that "[d]ue process should require at least
the same number of jurors to concur on the factual foundation for guilty verdicts as the number due
process requires on the verdicts themselves." Id at 6,19. Howe briefly addressed the aiding and abetting
factual nonconcurrence scenario in his article. See id. at 44-46.
66. 515 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1995).
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materiality as a legal issue for the court to decide as opposed to a fact for the jury
to decide,67 a practice eliminated by Gaudin.
The Gaudin court focused on the historical use of the practice to determine its
constitutionality. In rejecting the government's argument that having the court
determine materiality in peijury prosecutions was an uncontroverted, longstanding
historical exception, the Court observed that this practice was "neither as old, nor
as uniform, as the Government suggest[ed]. 6a More importantly, the Court stated
that "there was... no clear practice of having the judge detennine the materiality
question at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted. '69 In the end, the Court found
no consistent historical tradition supporting the practice that the court decide
materiality issues and refused to endorse one.
Applying the Gaudin Court's historical inquiry method of analysis, abrogation
of the unanimity requirement as to whether a defendant is a principal or an aider and
abettor in federal felony prosecutions is suspect. Having no unanimity requirement
was not the common law rule for felonies, nor was it the law at the time the Bill of
Rights was adopted. Moreover, abrogation of the unanimity requirement in common
law misdemeanor prosecutions was unclear and far from uniform. Also abrogation
of unanimity in federal prosecutions only dates to 1909. Thus, the federal courts'
abrogation of the unanimity requirement is likely incorrect and unsupported by a
clear historical tradition.7
The Supreme Court's emphasis on common law historical practice as
informative on the constitutionality of certain criminal procedural practices was also
evident in Schad v. Arizona.' Schad is the Court's most recent and thorough
exposition of the constitutional boundaries of verdict specificity and the permissible
abrogation of the unanimity requirement in criminal cases. Schad, decided four
years prior to Gaudin, similarly emphasized common law and historical practice
when considering a due process challenge to a first-degree murder conviction where
67. See id. at 517-18.
68. Id. at 515.
69. Id. at 516.
70. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996). In Egelhoff a plurality of the Court undertook
a similar historical inquiry to determine whether a state's elimination of the use of voluntary
intoxication as a mitigating factor of intent violated due process. To determine whether there was a
violation of due process, the Court focused on whether the state's action violated rules "'so [deeply]
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental."' Id. at 47
(quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). The plurality determined that history did
not support the notion that an intoxication defense was fundamental and held that the state statute,
which eliminated considering intoxication on the mens rea issue, did not violate due process. Id. at 56.
The Egelhoff Court's inquiry largely focused on historical records from the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted because the issue in the case was whether the state statute in question violated
due process. Id. at 48. Inquiry into whether a federal criminal practice violates due process implicates
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, historical inquiry into the unanimity
requirement focuses on the time of the ratification of the Bill of Rights. See generally Richardson v.
United States, 526 U.S. 813, 820 (1999) (recognizing that Congress's power to define crimes must
comport with fundamental fairness due process requirements).
71. 501 U.S. 624 (1991).
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the relevant state procedure did not require the jury to agree on one of the two
alternative theories of criminal liability offered by the prosecution.
In Schad, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder in Arizona state
court and sentenced to death. During his trial, the prosecution advanced both
premeditated and felony-murder theories. The trial court rejected the defendant's
argument that due process required the jury to unanimously agree on a single theory
of first-degree murder. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the Court addressed the issue of
whether it was a violation of the Due Process Clause to permit the jury to reach one
verdict based on any combination of the alternative findings."
A fractured Supreme Court upheld the conviction with a four Justice plurality
opinion and separate concurrence by Justice Scalia, who provided the necessary
fifth vote to uphold the conviction.73 All of the Justices agreed that the established
general rule is that jurors did not need to unanimously agree on the mode of
commission of a crime when various possibilities exist.74 Justice Scalia, in his lone
concurrence, observed that the "rule is not only constitutional, [but] it is probably
indispensable in a system that requires a unanimous jury verdict to convict. '75
However, the general rule allowing a verdict based on a combination of
alternative findings is not boundless. Common law crimes lacked the multiple
subparts, broad multiple objects, and general complexity of many modem federal
criminal statutes. As such, even where a criminal statute derived from the common
law proscribed several conjunctive acts, any one of which could be the proper basis
of a conviction, the range of variance was inherently circumscribed. With that
history, the Schad plurality framed the due process issue as one involving "the
permissible [legislative] limits in defining criminal conduct, as reflected in the
instructions to jurors applying the definitions, not one of juror unanimity. '76 The
plurality stated that the conviction of a defendant under legislation criminalizing
"any [generic] combination of jury findings of embezzlement, reckless driving,
murder, burglary, tax evasion, or littering" would violate due process, a proposition
on which all of the Justices seemed to agree. 7 The due process inquiry, grounded
in fundamental fairness, must serve to measure the level of definitional and verdict
specificity permitted by the Constitution.
72. See id. at 627-29, 633 n.4. By framing the issue in this manner, the Court rejected several
courts' resolution of the issue, who based their decisions on whether the alternative theories constituted
distinct conceptual groupings. All of the appellate cases that analyzed the unanimity issue as applied
to aiders and abettors and to principals used this pre-Schad conceptual groupings analysis. See id. at
634-35. Also see cases cited supra note 41.
73. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 627, 648.
74. Id. at 641 (plurality opinion); id. at 649 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 652-53 (White, J.,
dissenting).
75. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 650 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 631 (plurality opinion).
77. Id. at 633.
78. Id. at 632.
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The plurality determined that, as a constitutional matter, the jury must
unanimously find that the prosecution established every element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. However, as to a statutory element setting forth factual
alternatives, a jury does not need to always unanimously decide which of several
possible brute facts constitute a particular element. As the plurality stated, "' [T]here
is no general requirement that the jury reach agreement on the preliminary factual
issues which underlie the verdict."' 79 The Schad plurality further held that due
process does not require the jury to unanimously agree on one of the alternative
theories of first-degree murder.80
The plurality substantially relied on historical practice to support its holding.
The plurality stated that "it is significant that Arizona's equation of the mental states
of premeditated murder and felony murder as species of the blameworthy state of
mind required to prove a single offense of first-degree murder finds substantial
historical and contemporary echoes" going back to the common law.' The plurality
also noted that Arizona's statutory formulation of first-degree murder was identical
in all relevant respects to the first American statute defining murder by degree,
which was passed by the Pennsylvania legislature in 1794, and concluded:
[T]here is sufficiently widespread acceptance of the two mental
states as alternative means of satisfying the mens rea element of
the single crime of first-degree murder to persuade us that Arizona
has not departed from the norm.
Such historical and contemporary acceptance of Arizona's
definition of the offense and verdict practice is a strong indication
that they do not "'offen[d] some principle of justice so rooted in
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental . .'82
The plurality also relied on moral relativity in holding that the two factual
theories of first-degree murder, murder by deliberation and murder during the
course of a felony, carry the same degree of moral equivalence. 83 As such, the
plurality held the two theories are alternate means to establish the same statutory
element, and since due process does not require unanimity of means, there is no due
process violation.84 The plurality stated the following:
79. Id. (quoting McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433,449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted)).
80. Id. at 641-42.
81. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991).
82. Id. at 642 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).
83. Id. at 644.
84. Id. at 644-45.
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Whether or not everyone would agree that the mental state that
precipitates death in the course of robbery is the moral equivalent
of premeditation, it is clear that such equivalence could reasonably
be found, which is enough to rule out the argument that this moral
disparity bars treating them as alternative means to satisfy the
mental element of a single offense. 5
Notably, Schad concerned alternative means of satisfying the requisite
statutory mental state element. Thus, the case involved a situation where the
prosecution unanimously proved all of the actus reus elements to the jury beyond
a reasonable doubt. Regardless, the plurality saw no distinction between using
alternative theories to satisfy the actus reus element and using alternative theories
to satisfy the mens rea element. 6 However, there may be no significant due process
problems when a dispute concerns whether a defendant charged with a typical
breaking and entering crime used a screwdriver or a wrench, but analyzing moral
equivalence may be difficult when the charge is more complex and the factual
alternatives are more disparate.
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia categorically rejected the plurality's reliance
on a subjective notion of moral equivalence. 7 Instead, Justice Scalia asserted that
the due process inquiry relies exclusively on historical analysis, stating:
Submitting killing in the course of a robbery and premeditated
killing to the jury under a single charge is not some novel
composite that can be subjected to the indignity of "fundamental
fairness" review. It was the norm when this country was founded,
was the norm when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in
1868, and remains the norm today. Unless we are here to invent
a Constitution rather than enforce one, it is impossible that a
practice as old as the common law and still in existence in the vast
majority of States does not provide that process which is "due." 88
Justice Scalia added that he would have likely joined the dissent if he did not
believe the above statement.89 The four dissenting Justices argued that permitting
a jury to return a generic verdict following a prosecution on two separate murder
theories with different elements was analytically indistinguishable from a "freakish"
composite jury verdict based on alternative facts as disparate as embezzlement or
85. Id.
86. Id. at 632.
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reckless driving,90 which the plurality and Justice Scalia effectively conceded would
be so disparate as to violate due process.9
Because Schad is a plurality opinion, its precedential effect is inherently
problematic. In any event, after Schad, the "fundamental fairness" due process line
was imprecisely drawn at the point of not requiring unanimity or verdict specificity
for elements that were "not too diverse"-an inquiry strongly influenced by whether
such procedures were consistent with the common law. However, under this due
process framework, prosecutions for freakish, hypothetical umbrella crimes such as
"robbery or failure to file a tax return" would likely violate due process if courts did
not require verdict specificity and unanimity of theory. Moreover, Justice Scalia's
express rejection of the plurality's moral equivalence analysis as support to allow
juries to convictwithout a specific verdict or unanimous theory makes it improbable
that moral equivalence will influence the constitutional analysis.92
90. Id. at 656 (White, J., dissenting). The plurality made specific reference to a crime containing
a "freakish definition... that finds no analogue in history." Id. at 640 (plurality opinion).
91. Id. at 640 & n4 (plurality opinion); id. at 650-51 (Scalia, J., concurring).
92. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624,650-51 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). Since Schad, the
Court's composition has changed substantially, and it is difficult to determine whether the rationale of
the Schad plurality would today command a majority of the Court. With the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the announcement of Justice O'Connor's retirement prior to the commencement of the
October 2005 Term, only two members of the four-Justice Schad plurality, Justices Souter and
Kennedy, will remain on the Court. Chief Justice Roberts's comments at his confirmation hearing
suggest that Schad is not the type of decision that has created such overwhelming societal expectations
that overturning precedent would be unlikely. Chief Justice Roberts stated:
I do think that it is a jolt to the legal system when you overrule a precedent.
Precedent plays an important role in promoting stability and evenhandedness. It
is not enough that you may think the prior decision was wrongly decided. That
really doesn't answer the question; it just poses the question. And you do look at
these other factors like settled expectations, like the legitimacy of the court, like
whether a particular precedent is workable or not, whether a precedent has been
eroded by subsequent developments.
All Things Considered: Roberts Resists Specifics in Senate Session (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 13,
2005).
In addition, Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined the Court, while three of the dissenting
Justices left. Justice Thomas would likely agree with Justice Scalia's emphasis on history as the
exclusive means forresolving due process inquiries. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346,361-66 (1992)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (expressing the importance of common law history in resolving constitutional
questions). Justice Ginsburg provided a critical concurring vote and endorsed a historical analysis in
the fundamental fairness inquiry in Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 58-59 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). Justice Breyer authored the majority opinion in Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813
(1999), see infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text, which sidestepped the requirement of juror
unanimity as a constitutional issue but ultimately endorsed the requirement of juror unanimity via a
legislative history approach. Id. at 824. Justice Breyer's analysis implies a reinvigorated emphasis on
juror unanimity in criminal cases. Revisiting Schad would increase the likelihood that the Court would
undertake a focused inquiry of the factual nonconcurrence, non-unanimity of theory issues addressed
in this Article that were largely obscured in Schad. Indeed, Schad could meet the same fate as the
constitutional criminal procedure case of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which the court
overruled three years later in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). In Dixon, the Court noted
that the Grady test had little historical support and had proved unworkable. 509 U.S. at 703-12.
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Since Schad the Supreme Court has not provided any further guidance on how
to determine under what circumstances the Constitution requires juror unanimity
and verdict specificity in a criminal case. Eight years after Schad, the Court
sidestepped this constitutional issue in Richardson v. United States by holding that
the disputed statutory term in question was, as a matter of statutory interpretation
and not a matter of constitutionality, an element requiring jury unanimity."'
In Richardson, a six member majority held that in a narcotics prosecution under
21 U.S.C. § 848, jurors must not only unanimously agree that the defendant
committed some "continuous series of violations," but they must also unanimously
agree on which specific violations the defendant committed.94 The Court analyzed
the statute's language and its pertinent legislative history and held that Congress
intended the term "series of violations" to constitute a statutory element, which
required unanimous jury agreement; Congress did not intend the term to be a mere
means of satisfying a particular element.95 Justice Breyer, writing for the majority,
distinguished Schad and noted:
Where, for example, an element of robbery is force or the threat
of force, some jurors might conclude that the defendant used a
knife to create the threat; others might conclude he used a gun.
But that disagreement-a disagreement about means-would not
matter as long as all 12 jurors unanimously concluded that the
Government had proved the necessary related element, namely,
that the defendant had threatened force.96
A question remains as to what side of the Schad, or Schad-Richardson, due
process line a prosecutor's presentation of alternate theories of guilt as either a
principal or an aider and abettor falls. This inquiry is not easy. At first blush, it is
tempting to conclude that a situation like Schad-where the dispute concerns only
the means of commission and unanimity regarding the theory of commission is not
required-is analytically indistinguishable from a situation in which the jury is split
on a defendant's particular avenue of guilt as a principal offender or aider and
abettor since aiding and abetting is merely a theory of liability. Under this view,
verdict specificity requires nothing more than a general guilty verdict.
Certainly, if the issue can be resolved by utilizing the moral equivalence inquiry
endorsed by the plurality in Schad, then unanimity of theory should not be required.
Although the due process theory proposed here is probably consistent with Schad however so
interpreted, a reinvigorated due process standard resulting from a reexamination of Schad in an
appropriate case would only strengthen and clarify the constitutional due process concepts articulated
in this Article.
93. 526 U.S. 813, 817-19 (1999).
94. Id. at 815.
95. Id. at 815, 818.
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The federal aiding and abetting statute reflects a clear legislative judgment by
Congress that the aider and abettor is of equal moral culpability as the principal
offender.97 In this regard, as between a principal and a party that would have been
an accessory before the fact at common law, the aiding and abetting "divergence of
means" inquiry seems far easier to resolve in favor of not requiring unanimity than
under the situation at issue in Schad, where the Court also ultimately resolved in
favor of not requiring unanimity."
But that superficial alignment belies its complexity. As noted above, three
centuries of venerable common law history that uniformly drew no distinction
between the alternative means of satisfying the mental element of first-degree
murder influenced the Schad plurality. The Schad plurality approvingly cited the
common law, which defined murder as "the unlawful killing of another human
being with 'malice aforethought.' The intent to kill and the intent to commit a
felony were alternative aspects of the single concept of 'malice aforethought.'"
99
The plurality further noted that even when American jurisdictions divided murder
into degrees starting in 1794, most of the resulting statutes retained premeditated
murder and felony murder as alternate means of satisfying the mental element of
first-degree murder."° Moreover, as also noted above, the fact that the law at the
time of the founding of the republic did not require unanimity of means in first-
degree murder prosecutions substantially influenced Justice Scalia, who authored
the crucial fifth-vote concurrence in Schad.'°'
On the other hand, the modem federal aiding and abetting principles embodied
in 18 U.S.C. § 2 that apply to virtually all federal crimes are modem in a relative
sense--dating back only to 1909. The principles are less than a century old and thus
not nearly as old and established as the common law principles the plurality used
in Schad to support its holding that unanimity of means was not necessary.
Moreover, the aiding and abetting principles in 18 U.S.C. § 2, as applied to felonies,
reflect a specific rejection of certain common law rules thought to be arcane. The
Schad plurality specifically cautioned against such a scenario:
97. See I FINAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO REVISE AND CODIFY THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES at 118-119 (1906) (revisor's notes); 60 CONG. REC. H586 (1908) (statement of Rep. Moon).
Congress's judgment presumably also applies to all aiders and abettors who would have been
considered accessories before the fact at common law, even if the proof adduced at trial was disparate
and conflicting regarding whether a particular defendant provided assistance before the fact (by
purchasing gasoline) or actually committed the offense (by burning the building).
98. As noted above, the four dissenting Justices in Schad stated that a killing during the course
of robbery and premeditated murder were not morally equivalent acts. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624,
658 (1991) (White, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 640 (plurality opinion) (citing 3 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 21-22 (1883)).
100. Id. at 640-41.
101. Id. at 651 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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We note, however, the perhaps obvious proposition that history
will be less useful as a yardstick [in determining whether due
process is violated if unanimity is not required] in cases dealing
with modem statutory offenses lacking clear common-law roots
than it is in cases, like [Schad], that deal with crimes that existed
at common law.'0 2
Again, Justice Scalia did notjoin the plurality in all respects; he specifically rejected
any reliance on general notions of moral equivalence, instead relying on history and
tradition as the exclusive reason why the Arizona statute did not violate due
process. 103
This proposition should not be misunderstood as asserting that any legislative
attempt to change the common law violates due process. Such a position would not
only be untenable, but plainly absurd. ° Due process is violated when the
legislature makes a change so extreme and aberrant that it violates fundamental
fairness principles enshrined in the concept of due process.
Abrogation of a unanimity requirement in this context is no trivial matter.
Congress, in adopting modem aiding and abetting principles, clearly intended to
abrogate the old felony rules concerning verdict consistency by replacing them with
the clear rules that had always been applicable to misdemeanants and felony
second-degree principals at common law. Accordingly, in Standefer, the Supreme
Court had no difficulty in holding that the legislative elimination of the verdict
consistency requirement in federal felony prosecutions was constitutional."0 5
On the other hand, the common law absolutely prohibited abrogation of verdict
specificity, or otherwise eliminating the requirement of unanimity of theory as
between an aider and abettor and a principal, for felonies-and did not clearly
permit abrogation of verdict specificity and unanimity for misdemeanors. Congress
did not contemplate that verdict specificity would be abrogated by the federal
enactment of the modem aiding and abetting statute and it is unlikely that Congress
ever contemplated the topic at all.'°6 More significantly, verdict specificity and juror
unanimity requirements impact contemporary core due process principles and are
102. Id. at 640 n.7 (plurality opinion).
103. Id. at 651-52 (Scalia, J., concurring).
104. Interestingly, Justice Stevens, concurring in a recent opinion abolishing the death penalty
for those who were juveniles at the time of the crime's commission, criticized Justice Scalia's view of
the Bill of Rights as irrationally static: "If the meaning of [the Eighth] Amendment had been frozen
when it was originally drafted, it would impose no impediment to the execution of 7-year-old children
today." Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1205 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 368 (1989)).
105. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 21-25 (1980) (refusing to apply nonmutual
collateral estoppel in federal criminal cases).
106. The most authoritative compilations summarizing the goals of modem aiding and abetting
reform do not generally include abrogating the unanimity requirement among those goals. See, e.g.,
LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 13.1 (e) (discussing legislative reform to aiding and abetting principles).
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not generally thought to present obstacles to justice or to constitute obsolete relics
of arcane common law procedures. 7 Thus, it is not unjustifiable to conclude that
the purported legislative abrogation of the unanimity requirement in the context of
current interpretations of 18 U.S.C. § 2 is extreme, has scant historical support, and
violates due process. 8
107. In Standefer, the Court rejected the defendant's contention that "Congress did not view that
rule as an 'obstacle to justice"' because the legislative history did not specifically mention the common
law rule that the prior acquittal of the principal barred conviction of an accessory. See Standefer, 447
U.S. at 20 n. 12. However, that application does not control here. In the present situation, the proposed
abrogation of unanimity did not clearly reflect the rules for misdemeanors that it was purportedly
replacing. Moreover, there is no history of general criticism that the discrete concept ofjuror unanimity
posed an obstacle to justice. Instead, the general thought was that juror unanimity was one of the
hallmarks of Anglo-American justice. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *414; see also JOHN
PROFFATr, A TREATISE ON TRIAL BY JURY § 77, at 112-13 (1877) ("The unanimity of... the jury is
[an] essential attribute of a trial jury.... [T]he practice is so ancient and so long sanctioned, that the
idea of unanimity becomes inseparably connected in our minds with a verdict."). For a case discussing
the heightened importance of criminal jury decision making as instructive of contemporary due process
principles, see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
108. See supra note 107. Somewhat ironic is that this analysis in effect partially resurrects the
old common law distinctions between an accessory before the fact and a second-degree principal. If the
prosecution proceeds on alternative theories that a defendant was either a principal or an aider and
abettor in an accessory before the fact situation, due process should requirejuror unanimity as to theory.
Thus, in an arson prosecution, the jury would have to be unanimous as to whether the defendant bought
the gasoline or actually lit the match that burned the building.
This conclusion would not alter the existing requirements in "artificial" aiding and abetting
situations like United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1990), which are more properly
characterized as second-degree principal or co-principal cases. The Horton situation involves a
prosecution where evidence is presented that both assailants were present at the scene, and depending
on the nature of the charge, insoluble proof problems exist as to who actually did the act constituting
the element of the offense, such as who administered the fatal blow in a homicide prosecution. See id.
at 541-43. In these situations, due process should not require verdict specificity where some evidence
suggests that more than one actor was a principal and where the defendants would not have been
accessories before the fact at common law.
Several practical points should be recognized. First, courts may have to define the parameters of
when unanimity is required to satisfy due process. For example, many federal statutes criminalize
causating an event, which makes many actors principals by definition. Revised 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(2000), concerning fraud schemes using interstate private carriers, provides the following:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud.... places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter,
any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or
deposits or causes to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or
delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives
therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail
or such carrier according to the direction thereon... shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
See also United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1994) (discussing defendant's guilt
as a principal for causing the filing of a false financial statement). As the text of the statute indicates,
in addition to devising a scheme to defraud through the mail system, the actual mailing of a letter
constitutes the actus reus of mail fraud. Thus, individuals who do not actually mail the letter or
otherwise "cause" the mailing but are involved in the fraudulent scheme are aiders and abettors.
Allowing a defendant to create ambiguity and set up a musical chairs acquittal by offering evidence that
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Construing aiding and abetting liability as an alternative theory requiring
unanimity is not inconsistent with the Schad holding. Aiding and abetting as an
alternate theory of liability is not merely an alternative means of committing the
actus reus of the offense (for example, whether the perpetrator committed the
assault with a gun or a knife) or even an alternate means of satisfying mens rea (like
in Schad). Rather, at least with respect to a substantial category of aiders and
abettors under current federal law who would have been accessories before the fact
at common law, the aiding and abetting theory of liability obviates the prosecution
from having to prove that a particular defendant was the principal who committed
all of the other elements of the offense. This permits a wholesale substitution of one
set of facts establishing the commission of an offense for another."° In this context,
the contention that a guilty verdict may rest on a general verdict where, for example,
five jurors believe the defendant was the principal offender but the other seven
believe he aided and abetted some other person who was the principal offender is
unsettling. Moreover, aiding and abetting as an alternative theory of liability can be
placed on the same footing as the disparate hypothetical umbrella crimes that the
entire Schad Court agreed would require jury unanimity of theory and verdict
specificity in order to comport with due process. That should be the result here as
well.
Nevertheless, aiding and abetting is not quite a distinct statutory element that
fits into the Richardson mold either. Whether the aiding and abetting theory of
he actually mailed the letter-when all of the government's evidence suggests otherwise--makes little
sense. Under this analysis, some cases will be easy to resolve. As the caselaw develops, in cases where
unanimity of theory is not clearly required, perhaps the defendant should have the burden of
establishing unfairness if the government asserts that it is not required to establish unanimously that
a defendant was a principal or an aider and abettor. Such an approach is properly the subject of a
separate article. See generally Howe, supra note 65, at 82 (recognizing that "[i]t is impossible to
articulate a bright-line rule that defines an appropriate level of factual specificity . . . in all
circumstances").
Most post-Schad decisions reflect the lack of difficulty courts have in requiring the prosecution
to prove one theory or another to the unanimous satisfaction of thejury. For example, in United States
v. Davis, 306 F.3d 398,412-14 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1208 (2003), the defendant cited
Richardson in arguing that the jury was required to unanimously agree on which specific acts
constituted aiding and abetting. The Sixth Circuit rejected this argument, however, because the trial
court specifically charged the jury that it had to be unanimous in finding the defendant was an aider and
abettor. See id. at 414. United States v. Samuels, 308 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2002), is similar-the sole
theory of liability the jury considered was an aiding and abetting theory. Id. But see United States v.
Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 160-61 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding no plain error in instructing the jury that it could
find the defendant guilty as a principal or an aider and abettor and citing United States v. Peterson, 768
F.2d 64, 67 (2d Cir. 1985), for the proposition that thejury need not unanimously agree on whether the
defendant was a principal or an aider and abettor); Knoll, 16 F.3d at 1322-23 (acknowledging that the
evidence was insufficient to establish guilt as an aider and abettor but stating the record was unclear
as to which role the jury used as its basis for conviction).
109. For example, the defendant might purchase the materials (acts that in the abstract appear
wholly innocent and connote no moral blameworthiness) or actually set the fire five days later. See
United States v. Petty, 132 F.3d 373, 377 (7th Cir. 1997) ("In a sense, the essential elements of aiding
and abetting serve as a substitute for the defendant's actual physical participation in the crime.").
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liability requires juror unanimity is not a statutory interpretation question that can
be conclusively resolved by resorting to 1909 legislative history. Aiding and
abetting does not define a distinct offense, so legislative history cannot be parsed
with an inquiry into Congress's intent with respect to a particular statutory element.
Rather, it is an alternative route of liability that applies to virtually all federal
criminal offenses. In this regard, the 1909 enactment was a sui generis creature of
the law not easily pigeonholed on either side of the Richardson legislative intent or
Schad due process dividing line.
That said, Schad instructs that the inquiry ultimately becomes a due process
issue, grounded on whether the particular legislative enactment that does not require
verdict specificity violates fundamental fairness. In his lone concurrence, Justice
Scalia, agreeing with the plurality, noted the following with respect to jury
unanimity:
[Ilt has long been the general rule that when a single crime can be
committed in various ways, jurors need not agree upon the mode
of commission. That rule is not only constitutional, it is probably
indispensible in a system that requires a unanimous jury verdict to
convict. ... [I]t is also true... that one can conceive of novel
"umbrella" crimes... where permitting a 6-to-6 verdict would
seem contrary to due process.
The issue before us is whether the present crime falls into the
former or the latter category.'
The dissenting Justices in Schad easily concluded that a composite guilty
verdict where six jurors believed the murder was premeditated and six believed the
killing took place during the course of an enumerated felony violated due process
because proof of these two crimes involved such divergent elements."' Applying
this formulation, whether a particular defendant provided some off-site assistance
to another or physically committed the offense presents a factual combination of
jury findings far more divergent than those at issue in Schad. This alternative factual
combination of findings is thus more akin to the novel umbrella crimes that even the
Schad plurality acknowledged required unanimity.
Outside the Horton situation, which implicates other legal concerns unrelated
to aiding and abetting liability, the alternative aiding and abetting and principal
offender theories require substantially divergent factual paths to convict, which
seems to run afoul of the principles of the Schad dissent. To the extent Justice
Scalia based his critical fifth vote on due process principles grounded in a clear
historical approval of the procedure at issue, aiding and abetting history comes up
at least a century short.
110. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 649-50 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
111. See id. at 656 (White, J., dissenting).
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Ultimately, the due process inquiry of whether proof of a particular fact or
element in a criminal case requires unanimity depends on whether the operative
legal principle offends some fundamental fairness principle ofjustice. Applying the
Schad plurality's amorphous test, in which history and general notions of moral
equivalence weigh in the balance, both ingredients are not satisfied with respect to
not requiring aiding and abetting unanimity. Under any and all of the Schad
permutations, due process generally should require jury unanimity for aiding and
abetting; aiding and abetting liability cannot be characterized as a single crime that
can be committed in various ways where the jurors need not be unanimous upon the
mode of commission. Thus, a violation of due process should occur where a
criminal defendant is convicted without requiring unanimity as to whether he was
a principal offender or an aider and abettor. To the extent that current applications
of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) effectively infuse every federal crime with divergent statutory
elements, courts should interpret due process to require sufficient verdict specificity
and juror unanimity as to theory, even if evidence in the record supports both
theories. '
This conclusion has several important practical consequences. First, the modest
invigoration of juror unanimity as a component of due process is a positive
development. As the complexity of modem federal criminal law reaches beyond
common law constructs, the toleration of non-unanimous findings of mere means
has reached a breaking point. Special interrogatories and more detailed verdicts are
slowly becoming more common in federal criminal trials."' Second, requiring.
unanimity of theory would increase the "cost" of the prosecution's request for an
aiding and abetting instruction. In cases where the instruction is not supported by
the evidence, its inclusion could no longer improperly disguise a non-unanimous,
patchwork conclusion hidden by a general verdict, which is largely protected by
112. This approach does not require the government to elect one theory over the other, but it only
requires the existence of some evidence to support a conviction on both a direct principal theory and
a theory of aiding and abetting for the government to receive an aiding and abetting instruction. If the
government presents both theories to the jury, verdict specificity (where applicable) will then require
the government to establish a unified theory unanimously beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover,
requiring unanimity as to theory by the prosecution does not affect a defendant's ability to have thejury
instructed on inconsistent defenses. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63-65 (1988). At least
with respect to case-in-chief defenses, the defense has no burden of proof, and thus its option to pursue
inconsistent defenses does not create improper or asymmetrical obligations of proof.
113. Cf Adam H. Kurland, Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant With a Unilateral Right
to a Bench Trial: A Renewed Call to Amend Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(a), 26 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 309, 334 (1993) (discussing the relationship between federal criminal law's complexity and
the decline of juror unanimity requirements). With respect to the interpretation of individual federal
criminal statutes, the Supreme Court, as it did in Richardson, has again shown its desire to interpret
particular statutes to require jury unanimity as to particular facts. See Arthur Anderson, LLP v. United
States, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005) (reversing conviction where, inter alia, the jury instruction did not
require the jury to agree on one particular proceeding that defendant allegedly obstructed and
interpreting the particular statute to require specific nexus between the obstructive act and a particular
proceeding). See generally Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 60-61 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (endorsing the use of special interrogatories in complex criminal cases).
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favorable appellate standards of review." 4 Thus, prosecutors would be far less
inclined to ask for an aiding and abetting instruction when not warranted by the
evidence. Third, when the evidence supports an aiding and abetting instruction,
even when coupled with alternative evidence that the defendant was the principal
offender, the jury will have to be unanimous as to one theory to convict.
Fourth, the conclusion is consistent with existing analogous caselaw. For
example, the Sixth Circuit held that if the prosecution proceeds on alternative
theories that a particular defendant was either an aider and abettor or a causer under
§ 2(b), the jury must be unanimous as to theory."' The rationale for requiring
unanimity of theory must be that each theory requires a substantially different set
of factual findings with respect to the actor who physically committed the offense.
As an aider and abettor, the defendant must be found to share the criminal intent of
the other actor-the principal. As a causer under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b),' 6 the other actor
is usually an innocent instrumentality." 7 As such, the causer is a principal."s Thus,
proceeding under these two alternate theories presents a fairly substantial
divergence of means and requires unanimity of theory.' ' Similar logic underlies the
unanimity requirement as between a principal and an aider and abettor, which
concerns an equivalent, if not greater, factual divergence of means. Moreover,
because no long, consistent common law pedigree exists for permitting non-
unanimity as to theory in these types of felony prosecutions, requiring unanimity as
a matter of due process is consistent with Schad.
Fifth, as noted above, requiring unanimity for aiders and abettors who would
have been traditional accessories at common law-but not requiring unanimity in
the joint assault scenario (when the actors are both principals)-avoids the spectacle
of possible musical chairs or shell game acquittals, when codefendants each
acknowledge they were complicit in the offense but each argue that he was the
principal and the other the aider and abettor, or vice versa.' This result is
harmonized with Justice Scalia's concern that it would be absurd to set a defendant
free where a woman's charred body has been found in a burned house, and six
114. See United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding a conviction
despite the legal inadequacy of the aiding and abetting theory and the unclear record as to whether the
jury convicted the defendant as a principal or an aider and abettor).
115. United States v. Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115, 1125 (6th Cir. 1986).
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000) provides in relevant part that "[w]hoever willfully causes an act to
be done which if directly performed by him ... would be an offense against the United States, is
punishable as a principal."
117. The addition of§ 2(b) "removes all doubt that one who puts in motion or assists in the illegal
enterprise or causes the commission of an indispensable element of the offense by an
innocent ... instrumentality, is guilty as a principal even though he intentionally refrained from the
direct act constituting the completed offense." 18 U.S.C. § 2 hist. n. (2000).
118. According to Wharton 's Criminal Law, "a crime is deemed committed by the actor's own
hand when he procures and sends an innocent agent, an insane person, or an infant to engage in the
criminal conduct for him." TORCIA, supra note 37, § 30, at 184.
119. See Keefer, 799 F.2d at 1125.
120. See supra notes 36-39, 43, 45 and accompanying text.
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jurors believed the defendant strangled her to death and accidentally caused the fire
in his hasty escape while six others believed he left her unconscious and set the fire
to kill her.'
The above analysis amplifies the importance of respecting the core principle,
discussed at the outset, that a trial court must undertake careful scrutiny to ensure
that it does not give an aiding and abetting instruction when evidentiary support is
lacking. If that straightforward principle is honored, and not confused with other
related but distinct aiding and abetting principles, many of the difficult ancillary
issues concerning the unanimity of theory requirement can be avoided. In other
words, if no evidence suggests that a particular defendant aided and abetted the
offense, then no aiding and abetting instruction should be given. Presumably, the
jury's receipt of an improper aiding and abetting instruction, where there is no
evidence that a defendant aided and abetted another, should result in reversal. As
demonstrated below, reversal is not always the result."'
Lastly, in a related vein, federal aiding and abetting principles clearly establish
that, where the evidence warrants, an aiding and abetting instruction may be given
in a one-defendant case in the appropriate circumstances. For example, suppose two
defendants are indicted for a drug deal: one actually delivered the drugs and the
other stood as lookout. If Defendant A, the principal who actually delivered the
drugs, obtains severance or pleads guilty and Defendant B then proceeds to trial as
the sole defendant, an aiding and abetting instruction is appropriate as to Defendant
B because it will be consistent with the adduced proof that B aided someone else to
complete the offense.'
However, this uncontroverted principle does not mean that an aiding and
abetting instruction is appropriate in every one-defendant case where evidence of
joint participation exists. Rather, as explained above, an aiding and abetting
instruction is only appropriate if there is evidence that the defendant who is standing
trial aided and abetted the completed offense. The two situations are not the same.
Evenhanded application of these aiding and abetting principles should all be so
simple.
III. AIDING AND ABETTING RUN AMOK: A CASE STUDY
None of the flexible, pro-prosecution aiding and abetting principles-some of
dubious constitutionality-should trump the basic and overarching evidentiary
principle that an aiding and abetting instruction may be given only when supported
121. Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 650 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
122. See infra Part III. For a relatively uncommon example where receipt of an improper aiding
and abetting instruction resulted in reversal, see United States v. Moye, 422 F.3d 207 (4th Cir. 2005).
The dissenting judge in Moye would have affirmed based on harmless error. Id. at 220 (Hamilton, J.,
dissenting).
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by the evidence. In other words, the aiding and abetting principles discussed above
are only applicable where some evidence in the record supports criminal liability of
a particular defendant as an aider and abettor, regardless of whether the record
could also support the defendant's conviction as a principal.
These aiding and abetting principles exist in a legal environment where
prosecutors are not always required to present a consistent and unified evidentiary
theory. Consequently, this loose environment creates opportunities to overstep legal
boundaries. Further, the prosecution too often suffers no cost for requesting, and
receiving, an aiding and abetting instruction, even when the evidence does not
support the instruction.
Many cases stand for the correct proposition that "'while a defendant may be
charged and convicted as the principal even though the proof is that he was only an
aider and abettor.. . . , there must be evidence that someone other than the
defendant was the principal whom the defendant aided and abetted.""99
24
Unfortunately, the forgiving and flexible aiding and abetting principles are too
strong to resist and are too easily improperly applied. Thus, mandating juror
unanimity as to theory as a constitutional requirement takes on greater urgency. If
unanimity is constitutionally required, giving the instruction is less likely to be
misapplied, and even if the judge improperly gives the instruction, it would
ultimately cause less damage and confusion. If the government must unanimously
prove a single theory, the jury may not unanimously agree on any one theory. But,
where the jurors are unanimous, the verdict would clearly reflect upon which theory
the jurors relied.'25 Requiring unanimity would facilitate appellate review and
expose various unjustified presumptions that would otherwise be invoked to support
a harmless error determination. These benefits are substantial.
This discussion leads to the analysis of United States v. Thompson, 26 a case
recently decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. The District of Columbia Circuit, often referred to as the most influential
intermediate federal appellate court in the nation, 27 effectively held that an aiding
and abetting instruction can be presented without evidentiary support if mere
evidence of joint criminal activity exists. The court also held that a particular
defendant who physically committed all elements of the offense may be considered
an aider and abettor if someone else principally committed the offense but was not
124. Brooks v. United States, 599 A.2d 1094, 1099 (D.C. 1991) (alterations and emphasis in
original) (quoting Payton v. United States, 305 A.2d 512, 513 (D.C. 1973)).
125. In this regard, the jury verdict would be in the form of a special verdict, akin to special
findings under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c). Both special verdicts and special findings
serve to facilitate appellate review.
126. 279 F.3d 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 904 (2002).
127. The District of Columbia Circuit often serves as an audition for the Supreme Court. Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Thomas were formerly on the District of Columbia
Circuit. Additionally, this circuit hears many cases of national significance involving federal agencies.
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLTICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 273,292
(1990) (referencing this court as second most important court in the nation).
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the principal offender. 2s The decision represents a grossly incorrect extension of
aiding and abetting principles.
The facts of Thompson are not complicated. On October 23, 1997, various law
enforcement agencies set up a sting operation to arrest Mitchell Douglas, a
suspected drug dealer.'29 An undercover officer was prepared to videotape a drug
transaction with Douglas.
At the appointed time, surveillance spotted Douglas nearby, but an unknown
person, later identified as Michael Thompson, arrived to deliver a Burger King
paper cup. 3 The undercover officer (Officer Dessin) attempted to get Thompson
into the front seat of the car so that the police could surreptitiously tape the
transaction without obstruction to help establish, inter alia, that the deliverer
(Thompson) could see what was in the cup when Dessin opened it. However,
Thompson got in the back seat.'31
Dessin and Thompson exchanged the cup for $1500 cash.'32 According to the
testimony at trial, Dessin peeped inside the cup by slightly opening the lid, but the
government was unable to offer any testimony that Thompson, sitting in the back
seat directly behind Dessin, ever saw what was inside the cup.'33 The surveillance
operation recorded the brief conversation between Dessin and Thompson. This
conversation consisted of vague and cryptic statements, which were subject to
conflicting interpretations and speculation at trial. The entire conversation consisted
of the following:
DEFENDANT [D] Hey sir? You Rob's boy?
UNDER COVER OFFICER DESSIN [UC] Huh?
128. See Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1049-50 & n.6. Until Thompson, no reported decision ever held
that an aiding and abetting instruction can be presented without adequate evidentiary support simply
because of the possibility of joint criminal activity. A representative sampling of several District of
Columbia Circuit cases that rejected challenges of the jury's receipt of an aiding and abetting
instruction demonstrates that sufficient, albeit sometimes conflicting, evidence existed in the record to
support the aiding and abetting instruction as to each particular defendant. Also, the reviewing courts
made no unusual attempts to contort established doctrine in order to uphold the jury's receipt of these
instructions. United States v. Richardson, 817 F.2d 886 (D.C. Cir. 1987) is representative. There,
defendant Richardson was properly convicted under an aiding and abetting theory because the court
concluded that the government introduced ample evidence from which the jury could have inferred,
consistent with the aiding and abetting instruction, that another individual was guilty as the principal
in the crimes for which Richardson was convicted. Id. at 888. See also United States v. McKinley, 70
F.3d 1307, 1311, 1314 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that the aiding and abetting instruction was proper
based on evidence that characterized appellant's role in the drug distribution as "assisting"); United
States v. Oliphant, 525 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that "sufficient evidence [existed] to
permit the jury to find that appellant aided and abetted others").
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D- You Rob's boy?
UC- Yeah.
D- He just told me to give this to you.
UC- Come on this side man. Come on in. Let him in front.
[Defendant gets in rear passenger seat]




D- Are you straight?
UC- I'm straight. 34
Subsequent laboratory analysis established that the substance in the Burger
King cup was cocaine.' Thompson and Douglas were later indicted on various
federal narcotics charges. 36 Douglas was originally charged in all four counts of a
four count indictment that alleged "two separate acts of distribution and two
telephone facilitation counts."' 37 Thompson was charged only in count four, "which
charged both Thompson and Douglas with unlawful distribution of more than fifty
grams of cocaine base" in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 3
The appellate court's own characterization of the evidence established that, as
between Douglas and Thompson, Douglas (the target of the undercover operation)
was the far more culpable of the two.'39 Douglas pled guilty prior to trial.
Thereafter, Thompson proceeded to trial as the sole defendant on count four of the
indictment-the lone count for which he was indicted."4" All of the government's
evidence adduced at trial sought to establish that Thompson was the sole principal
offender who actually committed the principal offense of knowingly distributing
cocaine to the undercover officer. Based on this single act of drug distribution, the
government presented evidence that Thompson was the principal offender as that
term is universally understood in federal criminal law. 4 ' No evidence was presented
that Thompson aided and abetted the sole act of distribution for which he was
charged. Thus, the case fit the model where the least culpable actor was the
134. Id. at 1046; Transcript of Proceedings (Aug. 29, 2000) at 16-30, United States v. Thompson,
Cr. No. 00-016 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2000).




139. See United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (describing
Douglas as, inter alia, the original target, the one who "set up the transaction," and the one who
provided narcotics to Thompson, who acted as Douglas's agent), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 904 (2002).
140. Id. at 1046.
141. For a discussion of the common law definition and lineage of the term "principal offender,"
see supra note 13 and accompanying text. See also Perkins, supra note 61, at 581 (stating that a
principal is the "actual perpetrator of the felonious deed").
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principal offender, and the more culpable actor, had he proceeded to trial, would
have been liable for the act of drug distribution by virtue of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) as a
procurer, commander, or inducer.14
At trial, Douglas did not testify on behalf of the government, and the
government was unable to present any direct evidence that Thompson knew what
was inside the cup or that he otherwise possessed the requisite criminal
knowledge. 43 Thompson testified at trial where he denied criminal intent, stating
he never saw what was inside the cup and that Douglas told him the cup contained
a wad of cash to pay off a gambling debt.'" Thus, Thompson conceded that he
committed all of the physical acts-he actually delivered the cup containing the
cocaine. He only contested whether he possessed the requisite criminal intent.
45
Accordingly, the only valid theory of liability against Thompson was that of a
principal offender, not an aider and abettor. The government did not introduce any
evidence to support Thompson's liability for the one act of distribution for which
he was charged on an aiding and abetting theory. No evidence was introduced, as
an alternative theory or otherwise, that anyone other than Thompson actually
committed the completed offense. Nevertheless, over defense objection, the court
instructed the jury on the aiding and abetting theory based on 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). 46
In its closing argument, the government aggressively exploited the aiding and
abetting instruction by arguing that Thompson should be convicted on an aiding and
abetting theory because Douglas, who was not a defendant in the case, had the
requisite intent to knowingly distribute drugs and Thompson "facilitated" the drug
transaction by delivering the cup in exchange for money.'47 The jury convicted
Thompson on the one count. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
142. This scenario is not novel. Over fifty years ago, Professor Perkins noted the following:
One of the greatest social menaces of the present day is the man who would be
termed an accessory before the fact by the common law but in lay language is
referred to as the"brains" of a crime ring .... The guilt of his terrified underlings,
who carry out his [criminal] commands because they dare not disobey, is
certainly no greater than his. And it will not promote the general scheme of social
discipline to handicap the prosecution of such an offender by unreasonable
obstacles.
Perkins, supra note 61, at 620.
143. Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1046-47.
144. Id.
145. See id. at 1046-47, 1049.
146. Transcript of Proceedings (Aug. 30, 2000) at 124-25, United States v. Thompson, Cr. No.
00-016 (D.D.C. Nov. 14,2000). The government sometimes mistakenly submits an aiding and abetting
instruction for consideration when the aider and abettor in a multiple-defendant case pleads guilty on
the eve of trial and the government simply forgets to remove it from its previously compiled requested
instructions. However, given the manner in which the government aggressively utilized the instruction
in its closing argument in Thompson, the instruction's submission cannot be characterized as a mistake.
147. Id. at 93.
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Columbia Circuit upheld the conviction, determining that the trial court properly
gave the aiding and abetting instruction.
48
As earlier noted, the improper tender of an aiding and abetting instruction may
confuse the jury, leading the jury to convict a defendant without finding the
requisite criminal intent. The principle that an aiding and abetting instruction may
be given when warranted by the evidence, even when the aiding and abetting statute
is not charged in the indictment, is not being challenged. Also, the principle that one
charged as a principal can be convicted as an aider and abettor, provided the
evidence warrants this result, is not being challenged. However, the non-unanimity
of theory principle, where the jury can convict even if some jurors find the
defendant was a principal while other jurors find he was an aider and abettor, is
being challenged. The concept, implicitly endorsed in Thompson, that an aiding and
abetting instruction is proper even when no evidence supports the instruction, is also
being challenged. In Thompson, had a unanimity of theory instruction been
required, that unanimity instruction, coupled with a special verdict, would have
removed any doubt concerning whether the jury properly found the requisite intent
beyond a reasonable doubt. 49
Thompson substantially altered settled caselaw concerning the scope and proper
application of the key aiding and abetting instruction as reflected in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a). Thompson goes far beyond even some of the unchallenged but nonetheless
questionable aiding and abetting principles and is fundamentally at odds with the
caselaw in every other circuit. 0
As noted above, the undisputed facts established that Thompson committed all
of the physical acts constituting the narcotics distribution offense. He only contested
mens rea."' Therefore, the government's only valid theory of criminal liability
against Thompson was that he was a principal offender who committed an offense
against the United States. In these circumstances, a jury instruction that Thompson
might also be guilty as one who aided and abetted in committing a crime was
improper as a matter of law.
Application of 18 U.S.C. § 2(a), where appropriate, permits imposition of
criminal liability when a defendant has not personally committed every act or
148. United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1046-50 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S. 904 (2002). The court also held that, even assuming error, the error was harmless. Id. at 1050.
Although appellate issues are noted in passing, see infra notes 187-98 and accompanying text, this
Article does not comprehensively address issues concerning how improper jury instructions should be
evaluated on appeal.
149. Had the trial court not given the aiding and abetting instruction, a guilty verdict would have
established beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury found Thompson had the requisite criminal intent,
thereby rejecting his lack of mens rea defense. If the court gave the aiding and abetting instruction,
coupled with a unanimity of theory instruction, a verdict based on liability as a principal would be valid
as set forth above. On the other hand, a unanimous verdict based on an aiding and abetting theory would
expose that thejury was misled and ought to result in reversal based on insufficient evidence to support
the verdict.
150. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
151. Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1046-47.
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element of the offense. Read in its entirety, § 2(a) reveals that it does not merely
apply to underlings who aided and abetted more culpable actors in committing a
criminal offense. Rather, it also applies to the kingpins and ringleaders, because
these "higher-ups" counsel, command, procure, or induce their underlings to
actually commit the criminal acts."52
The aiding and abetting instruction may be given only when the evidence
warrants because it instructs the jury that it may convict a defendant even when the
evidence does not establish that a defendant personally committed every element
of the offense.' This rule must be scrupulously adhered to because the instruction
carries enormous potential for jury confusion when it is given where it is not
warranted.
As noted above, Thompson proceeded to trial as the sole defendant on one
narcotics distribution count. 4 The evidence was uncontroverted that Thompson
physically delivered a Burger King cup containing a small amount of cocaine to an
undercover officer.'55 The sole disputed issue was Thompson's intent to distribute
narcotics and knowledge that he was doing so. In the rubric of the jury instructions
and 18 U.S.C. § 2, Thompson's guilt, if he was guilty, was that of a principal
offender-one who, according to 18 U.S.C. § 2, actually "commit[ted] an offense
against the United States." The government presented no evidence that Thompson
aided and abetted another person who committed the completed offense. Thompson
was the only person who could have actually committed the completed offense of
actually distributing the narcotics. 56
Operating in a legal environment of almost unbridled flexibility in the
application of aiding and abetting concepts, the District of Columbia Circuit
mistakenly and needlessly contorted the venerable and heretofore straightforward
concept of a principal offender. As previously discussed, "principal offender" is a
common law term of art specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in Standefer
as denoting the party who physically committed the offense; the principal is
distinguished from other actors who aided and abetted the principal offender in the
commission of the offense but did not physically commit the offense themselves.'57
The pertinent District of Columbia Red Book instruction uses this "principal
offender" terminology. 8 This instruction was directly derived from a 1901 local
District of Columbia aiding and abetting statute enacted by Congress, which
predated Congress's enactment of what ultimately became 18 U.S.C. § 2 by a few
152. See Perkins, supra note 61, at 620.
153. The Thompson jury was so instructed. See Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 146, at
124-25.
154. Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1046.
155. Id. at 1046-47.
156. Again, the original codefendant Douglas pled guilty prior to trial. Id. at 1046.
157. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15 (1980) (citing to common law principle that an
accessory could not be convicted without the prior conviction of the principal offender).
158. D.C. RED BOOK, supra note 8, 4.02.
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years."5 9 The Thompson district court gave an aiding and abetting instruction,
similar to the Red Book's instruction, that referred to a principal offender."6
However, the District of Columbia Circuit misconstrued the law in several
respects when it concluded that "based on the evidence before it,.. . Thompson
aided and abetted Douglas, the principal, in the distribution of cocaine base to
[undercover Officer] Dessin. Thompson is under the misconception that because he
physically handed the drugs to Dessin, he is the only person who could be a
principal."'' This contention is a non sequitur and is incorrect because Thompson
did not argue that because he physically delivered the drugs he was the only person
who could be the principal. The court's statement reflects its unnecessary insistence
with characterizing Douglas, the crime boss or non-underling, as some sort of
principal offender, constructive or otherwise, no matter the doctrinal cost. 62
Moreover, even if Douglas, who was not a party to the trial, could somehow be
classified as a principal on these facts, that classification would only establish that
both Douglas and Thompson were principals, not that Thompson was an aider and
abetter. In other words, even if two principals exist, the underling principal is not
automatically an aider an abettor.
The aiding and abetting instruction given in Thompson, derived from 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a), provided in pertinent part:
If you find that another person may have been involved, you may
also find the defendant guilty of the crime charged in the
indictment without finding that he personally committed each of
the acts that make up the crime. Any person who in some way
intentionally participates in the commission of a crime, aides and
abets the principal offender. 63
The instruction thus informed the jury that it could convict the defendant even if he
did not do every act constituting the offense.' Here, the instruction was improper
and misleading because Thompson conceded he committed all of the physical
159. See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 17-20. Recognition of this lineage explains why the term
principal offender appears in the pertinent District of Columbia Red Book instruction. It also provides
support for an explanation why other popular model federal jury instructions, which are used in other
circuits that do not derive from this statutory lineage, do not rely on the specific term. See supra text
accompanying notes 23-26 (noting that other model instructions use similar terms).
160. See id. at 1050 n.9 (providing the district court's jury instruction).
161. Id. at 1049.
162. The court essentially characterized Douglas as what would have been a principal in the
second degree at common law. See TORCIA, supra note 37, § 31, at 186-89. Whether Douglas was
"constructively present" is debatable but unnecessary and irrelevant under modern aiding and abetting
principles. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
163. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 146, at 124 (emphasis added).
164. See generally Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949) (endorsing the
general principle that an aiding and abetting instruction is proper where evidence shows that the
defendant aided and abetted another to actually commit the offense).
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acts-he only contested the element of requisite mental intent. Thus, the improper
instruction could serve but one purpose-to confuse the jury so as to abrogate the
government's burden of proof. Because intent was the only factual element at issue,
the instruction permitted the jury to find Thompson guilty even if it was not
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the requisite mental intent.165
Under § 2(a), a person is punishable as a principal if he "aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures" another to "commit[] an offense.""' Thus
Douglas, who pled guilty prior to trial, mayproperly be classified as one punishable
as a principal because he commanded, procured, or induced Thompson to commit
the offense. However, that Douglas may be punishable as a principal does not mean
an aiding and abetting instruction was proper as to Thompson. The court of appeals'
opinion confuses the concept that there may be more than one principal with the
legally incorrect conclusion that if Douglas is a principal (or even punishable as a
principal) then Thompson must ipsofacto be an aider and abettor. 6 7
The court's conclusion dangerously misapplies recognized principles. As noted
above, an aiding and abetting theory is implied in every charge under federal law. 63
However, implying aiding and abetting theory in every charge does not mean an
aiding and abetting instruction is proper in all cases. Rather, it means that an aiding
and abetting instruction may be given even when not alleged in the indictment,
assuming the evidence supports the instruction.
Again, Thompson committed all of the physical acts constituting the charged
offense. Thus, there was no evidentiary basis to support an instruction that he aided
and abetted the completed offense in some manner other than actually committing
the offense himself. Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Circuit held that even
though Thompson committed the actual offense, he was still properly charged and
convicted as an aider and abettor simply because Douglas was the more culpable
actor.'69 This result is legally incorrect and contrary to the law of other circuits. '
70
165. That concern was magnified here because of the emphatic and improper manner in which
the prosecution relied on this instruction in its closing argument. See supra notes 146-47 and
accompanying text.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
167. See United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537
U.S, 904 (2002).
168. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
169. See Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1049-50.
170. See United States v. Moye, 422 F.3d 207,214 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding aiding and abetting
instruction improper on felon in possession of a firearm charge where there is no evidentiary foundation
that alleged principal who possessed firearm was a felon); United States v. Petty, 132 F.3d 373, 377
(7th Cir. 1997) (stating the evidence must establish that the defendant intentionally helped someone else
commit the crime; "[T]he essential elements of aiding and abetting serve as a substitute for the
defendant's actual physical participation in the crime."); United States v. Clark, 980 F.2d 1143, 1146
(8th Cir. 1992) (holding there is no need to prove the principal's identity in order to obtain an aiding
and abetting conviction if the evidence shows the underlying crime was actually committed); United
States v. Langston, 970 F.2d 692, 705 (10th Cir. 1992) ("The proof [of aiding and abetting] must
establish the commission of the offense by someone and the aiding and abetting by the defendant so
charged." (emphasis added) (quoting White v. United States, 366 F.2d 474, 476 (10th Cir. 1966)));
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The fatal flaw in the court of appeals' reasoning is its implicit, mistaken legal
assumption that aiding and abetting liability is reserved solely for relative
underlings like Thompson, even if the underling actually commits the completed
offense. The court's analysis effectively ignored the commander and inducer
component of § 2(a), thus distorting the proper application of the statute.
The District of Columbia Circuit's flawed logic is even more apparent in its
ultimate legal conclusion that "[u]nder these circumstances, the jury could have
reasonably found that Thompson aided and abetted the distribution committed
principally by Douglas.'"' This ultimate conclusion is convoluted and nonsensical
because it misconstrues a well-understood legal term of art and unnecessarily
creates a new and fatally flawed concept-the concept of one who "principally
commits" an offense. This new concept is not synonymous with the time-honored
and recognized concept of a principal offender, the one who actually commits the
offense.'72 Through this new concept, the court attempted to classify the more
culpable actor as some sort of principal even though modem aiding and abetting
principles rendered that effort unnecessary. In the context of the Thompson case, the
only rationale for creating this new concept was to uphold the receipt of the aiding
and abetting instruction where such instruction was not warranted under existing
law. 173
The District of Columbia Circuit's conclusion injects chaos, not clarity, into the
law. As noted above, 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) clearly covers ringleaders if they command,
procure, or induce underlings to actually commit the offense and thus renders the
underling a principal offender. Thompson actually delivered the cup containing
cocaine to the undercover officer. Thus, if Thompson had the requisite knowledge
and intent, then his criminal liability is exclusively that of a principal offender.
Douglas's liability with respect to the distribution, although he may be the far more
culpable actor, would be as an aider, abettor, commander, or inducer via 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a). Thompson unnecessarily justified the aiding and abetting instruction by
creating the new and convoluted concept that Douglas "principally committed" the
United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that an instruction is
appropriate only when warranted by the evidence-"[o]ne cannot aid or abet himself"); United States
v. Damsky, 740 F.2d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 1984) ("A trial court may give an aiding and abetting charge
where... the prosecution makes known that it intends to pursue an aiding and abetting theory and when
the evidence warrants such a charge."); Feldstein v. United States, 429 F.2d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1970)
(stating that an aiding and abetting conviction is proper even if the identity of the principal is not
established).
171. Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1049-50.
172. See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 15-20 (1980); SAND ET AL., supra note 14,
11.01, at 11-7 & n.8,
173. The corollary rationale is that the new concept provides a basis to denominate the most
culpable actor as a principal. Although the "principally commits" label may be linguistically and even
psychologically appealing, it is doctrinally unnecessary. In any event, from a doctrinal standpoint,
because Douglas was not a party to the trial, the holding's precedential value will be its effect on
complicity doctrines with respect to the party before the court. For an example of a misinterpretation
of Thompson's holding, see infra note 206 and accompanying text.
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distribution when the undisputed evidence showed that Thompson-and Thompson
alone-was the principal offender who physically committed the act of distribution
that constituted the charged offense. The court's decision therefore turns aiding and
abetting principles on their heads by effectively transforming every principal into
an aider and abettor-and vice versa-without any supporting evidence whatsoever.
That logic represents the ultimate overreaching application of the flexible aiding
and abetting principles set forth in Part 11 that before now had been uncritically
accepted for the most part. Left unchallenged, Thompson stands for the ludicrous,
indeed radical, proposition that an aiding and abetting instruction can never be
improper in any case involving multi-party criminality. 174
Moreover, to recognize fully the subtle allure and inevitable overextension of
current aiding and betting principles, one must note the District of Columbia
Circuit's efforts in attempting to provide legal justification for its conclusion in
Thompson. In Pandora's box-like fashion, these efforts serve largely to sow
unnecessarily seeds of confusion into other doctrinal areas.
First, the Thompson court correctly noted that the law does not prohibit
classifying two offenders as principals.'5 For example, if two individuals go into
a bank to rob it, both holding guns and demanding money, they would both be
principals and may be convicted as principals without an aiding and abetting
instruction. But this proposition was never at issue and is irrelevant in this
discussion. The best that can be said for the court's analysis is that it strained-for
no good reason-to establish that Douglas, who was not even a defendant in the
trial, may have been a principal even though he did not actually deliver the drugs.
Second, the court's unremitting determination to extend aiding and abetting
principles was evident in its efforts to apply constructive transfer principles. Again,
by resorting to these principles, which the parties did not present or argue at trial,
the District of Columbia Circuit needlessly strained to transform the more culpable
participant, who was not even a defendant at trial, into the principal offender. The
court did not do this because Douglas's criminal liability depended on such a
characterization or to resolve an insoluble proof problem of the Horton variety.'76
174. To further illustrate the point, suppose a Mafia Don orders a hit and instructs an underling
hitman to actually commit the murder. The hitman shoots and kills the victim. If the hitman is tried
separately for the murder, the hitman is the principal offender; an aiding and abetting instruction is
inappropriate even though the prosecution may present evidence that the hitman was acting on orders
from the Mafia Don and in the ranks, the hitman is a "little fish" or underling in relation to the Don.
On the other hand, at his separate trial, the Mafia Don is punishable as a principal under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2(a) because he commanded and induced the offense. The Don's liability as a principal does not make
the hitman an aider and abettor.
However, because the Don principally committed the offense, a court applying Thompson would
hold that making the hitman an aider and abettor and giving an aiding and abetting instruction is
appropriate even when the hitman is tried separately.
175. See Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1049.
176. For a discussion of Horton, see supra notes 44-45, 65, 108 and accompanying text. Note
that Thompson did not present a Horton conundrum, where the court deemed it necessary and
appropriate to resort to an aiding and abetting instruction and not require unanimity of theory to address
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Rather, the sole purpose of transforming Douglas into a type of principal offender
was to transform Thompson into an aider and abettor and thus justify the aiding and
abetting instruction.
The District of Columbia Circuit relied on United States v. Waller,17 7 a seldom-
cited thirty-year-old opinion. In Waller, the defendant challenged her drug
distribution conviction because she did not physically deliver the drugs to the
informant.17 The defendant commanded her young daughter to get the drugs and
bring them to her.'79 Her daughter left the room and returned with six bags
containing heroin and handed the drugs to the informant without further instruction
from her mother.' The Seventh Circuit found sufficient evidence that the
defendant "constructively transferred" the drugs because of her close contact with
her daughter and exercise of complete control over the situation where a minor
child, who may well have been an innocent conduit, undertook the physical
transfer.' 8'
While Waller applied concepts of constructive transfer to impose liability as a
principal upon anon-physical transferor, the case does not speak to the central issue
in Thompson: whether the trial court properly instructed the jury that Thompson
could be liable as an aider and abettor. Further, Thompson was not a minor, and the
government did not argue the concept of constructive transfer at trial or on appeal.
In short, whatever principle Waller may yield regarding how Douglas (a non-party)
may be characterized, the case does not state a legal principle applicable to whether
the jury was properly instructed that Thompson's guilt could be found as an aider
and abettor or whether the jury should have only considered whether Thompson's
guilt could be established as a principal offender who actually committed an offense
against the United States." 2
The court of appeals' further elucidation of constructive transfer principles and
reliance on the district court's opinion in United States v. Edmonds fare no better.'
the musical chairs scenario of two assailants and inconclusive proof as to which particular actor
administered the fatal blow.
177. 503 F.2d 1014 (7th Cir. 1974). Thompson cites Waller. See Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1050
n.7.
178. Waller, 503 F.2d at 1015.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1015-16.
182. In addition, Waller was a bench trial where Waller's liability was also clearly established
as a causer via an innocent instrumentality based on 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2000). Because the case was
tried to the court, the conviction may be upheld under § 2(b) in the absence of an instrumentality
instruction at trial if the evidence supports the judgment below. See generally 2 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT, FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 374, at 471 & n. 13 (3d ed. 2000) (citing cases where
appellate courts, in the absence of special findings, reviewed the facts to find the evidence supported
the judgment). Thus, Waller in no way supports the legal conclusion that an aiding and abetting
instruction was proper as to Thompson.
183. See United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1049-50 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing United
States v. Edmonds, 765 F. Supp. 1112 (D.D.C. 1991), rev d in part on other grounds, 69 F.3d 1172
(D.C. Cir. 1995)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 904 (2002).
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Edmonds involved a lengthy prosecution of an enormous drug distribution
network, 84 but offers no support that the aiding and abetting instruction was proper
in Thompson. In addition to the same general critique of the constructive transfer
theory discussed above-namely that using the constructive transfer principle to
make someone a principal does not automatically turn the person who actually
committed the physical act into an aider and abettor-the aiding and abetting
instruction in Edmonds was deemed appropriate because "[i]n the alternative, there
[was] ample evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Edmonds aided and abetted the distribution of drugs .... [and] that someone
[else] committed the crime of distribution."' 5
This evidence is precisely the type that did not exist in Thompson. As noted
above, the undisputed evidence established that if Thompson possessed the requisite
mens rea, he was liable as a principal offender as the one who actually committed
an offense against the United States. The government presented no alternative
evidence that he aided and abetted someone else in the commission of the offense.
No one other than Thompson-neither Douglas nor anyone else-could have
actually committed the completed offense. Thus, the aiding and abetting instruction
tendered at trial was unsupported by the evidence and was erroneous. As a result,
the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion concluding that the aiding and abetting
instruction was proper represents a radical and incorrect departure from the uniform
case law of every circuit. 8
United States v. Martin,8 7 an Eleventh Circuit decision, illustrates the proper
analysis finding harmful error in tendering an improper aiding and abetting
instruction. Martin is analytically similar to Thompson-the defendant was charged
with attempt to possess a controlled substance.'88 In Martin, the affirmative
inclusion of the aiding and abetting charge was problematic because no person other
than Martin was charged with the commission of the principal offense, and the
184. Edmonds, 765 F. Supp. at 1114-16.
185. Id. at 1117.
186. See supra note 170. United States v. Martin, 747 F.2d 1404, 1407 (11 th Cir. 1984) and the
other cases previously noted set forth the controlling principle that an aiding and abetting instruction
is proper only when warranted by some evidence in the record that the defendant aided and abetted
someone else who actually committed the criminal offense. Thompson's favorable and purportedly
controlling reference to United States v. Yost, 24 F.3d 99 (10th Cir. 1994), in no way undermines the
argument set forth here. See Thompson, 279 F.3d at 1049 n.6. Yost merely restates the uncontroverted
propositions that an aiding and abetting instruction is inappropriate only if there is evidence that one
person was involved in the offense but is appropriate if there is evidence that the defendant aided
someone else in committing the crime. See Yost, 24 F.2d at 104. To limit Martin as holding that an
aiding and abetting instruction is improper only if the evidence fails to indicate the commission of the
offense by a principal is a far too narrow interpretation. See SAND ET AL., supra note 14, 11.01, at I 1-
8 & nn.14-15 (correctly stating the multiple propositions of Martin). In any event, even the most
limited interpretation of Yost is inapposite here because Thompson alone committed the physical acts
constituting the offense-he did not aid Douglas or anyone else who actually committed the offense.
187. 747 F.2d 1404 (11 th Cir. 1984).
188. Id. at 1405-06.
[Vol. 57: 85
46
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss1/4
2005] A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL AIDING AND ABETTING PRINCIPLES 131
questioned jury instruction referred to aiding and abetting "other persons" even
though the evidence was undisputed that no person other than Martin committed the
principal offense. 89
The Eleventh Circuit held that the aiding and abetting instruction constituted
reversible error because, based on the undisputed evidence, the instruction "in
effect[] told [the jury] that it could convict Martin for aiding or abetting Girst or
Norwood" when neither Girst nor Norwood committed any principal offense.' 90 In
other words, the conviction was infirm because the jury was improperly instructed
on an aiding and abetting theory that effectively let the jury convict without clearly
finding that the defendant committed every element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. 9' The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[w]e cannot exclude the
possibility that the jury convicted Martin of offenses alleged improperly, not cured
by jury instructions, and not supported by the evidence.' 92
Similarly, Russell v. United States'93 applies the correct analysis, finding an
improper instruction and plain error. In Russell, the sole defendant was charged
with destruction of property and possession of a Molotov cocktail .194 Despite the
complete lack of evidence that anyone other than the defendant actually committed
the offense, the trial court failed to intervene sua sponte when the prosecution
argued in the alternative that the defendant's guilt could also be premised on an
aiding and abetting theory. 95 Although the defense did not make a timely objection,
thus necessitating plain error review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
held the improper aiding and abetting instruction, coupled with the improper
argument, constituted plain error. 96
Thompson, another plain error case, cannot be justified as mandated by the
strictures of plain error review. 197 Russell demonstrates that even within the
strictures of plain error review, convictions based on improper aiding and abetting
instructions require reversal in appropriate circumstances.
189. Id. at 1407.
190. Id. at 1408.
191. See id. (reversing the conviction based on an improper aiding and abetting instruction,
concluding that the jury instructions compounded the deficiencies in the indictment and the jury,
"unable to find all elements of the principal offense, [improperly relied on the] aiding or abetting
[instruction], which need not include all elements of the principal offense").
192. Id. at 1408.
193. 701 A.2d 1093 (D.C. 1997).
194. Id. at 1094.
195. Id. at 1095-98.
196. Id. at 1098-1100.
197. At trial, defense counsel objected to the aiding and abetting instruction on somewhat related
grounds. Controlling authority could have supported a more defense-favorable standard of review under
the circumstances. See United States v. Purvis, 21 F.3d 1128, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 599 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994). But the appellate court in Thompson chose to only
review for plain error. See United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1049 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 904 (2002).
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Why does all this matter? Just as one jurist, over a half-century ago, questioned
the wisdom of contorting hearsay doctrine to convict a small-time bookmaker,'98 it
is similarly not worth contorting already strained aiding and abetting principles to
convict an alleged small-time drug dealer. Thompson illustrates that the uncritical
acceptance of what are now considered basic aiding and abetting principles simply
invites overreaching to the point of doctrinal poison.
An improperly tendered aiding and abetting instruction works to confuse the
jury on the cardinal issue of the government's obligation to prove intent beyond a
reasonable doubt. The improper instruction directs the jury to consider guilt based
on actions that do not constitute the complete offense, actions which may be wholly
innocent in the abstract.
Many courts have eloquently recognized the seminal importance of mens rea
as a first among equals, even under the heightened appellate strictures of plain error
review. For example, in United States v. Sturm, the First Circuit stated the
following:
Ordinarily, we do not consider issues that were not raised at trial.
Nevertheless, we retain the power to consider such issues, even on
our own initiative, to prevent a "clear miscarriage ofjustice." This
case meets that exacting standard. Jury instructions that allow a
conviction even though the jury may not have found that the
defendant possessed the mental state required for the crime
constitute plain error. Furthermore, the sacred status that our
system of criminal law accords mens rea mandates that such an
error cannot be treated as harmless. 99
Similarly, in the famous case ofMorissette v. United States, the Supreme Court
reversed a conviction based on an improper jury instruction concerning criminal
intent although there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction.2" Justice
Jackson recognized the cardinal importance of proper jury instructions and wryly
observed:
Had the jury convicted on proper instructions it would be the end
of the matter. But juries are not bound by what seems inescapable
logic to judges. [The jury] might have concluded [that the
198. People v. Barnhart, 153 P.2d 214, 219 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944) (Doran, J., concurring)
(arguing that placing of bets over the phone by anonymous declarants constitutes hearsay and stating
that "[to relax the [hearsay rule] just to uphold the conviction of a bookmaker, or for any other
purpose, is nothing short of judicial stupidity.").
199. United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 776-77 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
200. 342 U.S. 246, 273-76 (1952). This case often appears in first year criminal law casebooks
as illustrative of basic mens rea principles. See, e.g., PHILLIP E. JOHNSON & MORGAN CLOUD,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 37-44 (7th ed. 2002) (providing Morisette in Chapter
1, "Basic Culpability Doctrines").
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defense's evidence raised a reasonable doubt of guilt and]...
[t]hey might have refused to brand [the defendant a criminal]. Had
they done so, that too would have been the end of the matter.20
As in Morissette and Sturm, the jury instruction error in Thompson adversely
affected the bedrock principle of the government's burden of establishing mens rea
beyond a reasonable doubt. As such, Thompson calls into question long-recognized
and well-settled aiding and abetting principles that-along with conspiracy
law-have served as the cornerstones of criminal liability for those actors who do
not actually commit the completed offense. Again, the focus must be on first
developing fair, comprehensible, and coherent doctrines and then on properly
limiting the instruction.
Many of the problems created by Thompson could be substantially mitigated
if due process is interpreted to require juror unanimity where the government
proceeds on both principal and aiding and abetting theories as to a particular
defendant or defendants. 2 Such a procedural requirement would result in a clear
determination of which theory the jury relied on, thus making it easier to identify
whether an improper instruction influenced the verdict. 03
Consider the somewhat analogous context ofa prosecution based on alternative
theories of guilt as either an aider and abettor or a causer under § 2(b). In that
situation, the Sixth Circuit has held that jury unanimity as to theory is required.2"
Although the Sixth Circuit's decision predates Schad, its logic is consistent with the
201. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 276.
202. Due process should at least be interpreted to require unanimity in non-Horton situations
where the evidence of aiding and abetting comports with what would have been considered an
accessory before the fact at common law. That would, to some degree, reinstate some of the common
law problems of fighting over the characterization of one constructively present and therefore a
principal in the second degree not requiring juror unanimity of theory with the characterization of one
as an accessory before the fact requiring juror unanimity where alternative theories of guilt as either
a principal or an accessory are presented. While recognizing this characterization may be difficult in
some cases, see. e.g., Howe, supra note 64, at 82 (recognizing that "[i]t is impossible to articulate a
bright-line rule that defines an appropriate level of factual specificity... in all circumstances"), it
would not have presented a problem in Thompson. There was no dispute whether Thompson was
present or not, constructive or otherwise-he physically committed the offense and should have
received instructions on his liability as a principal, not as an aider an abettor.
203. See United States v. Knoll, 16 F.3d 1313, 1322-23 (2d Cir. 1994) (affirming conviction
although the record was unclear regarding whether the jury relied on an improper aiding and abetting
theory); cf Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46,59-60 (1991) (stating that the jury is presumed to find
the proper factual scenario over a factual theory not supported by the evidence). The jury is the
factfinder. Presuming that a jury properly found the facts is one thing. But this presumption does not
lead to the presumption that ajury would ignore and not apply an improper instruction tendered by the
judge with all the imprimatur of a correct instruction. Indeed, to assume the jury will ignore an
instruction is tantamount to jury nullification. Griffin did not implicate these concerns. See Yates v.
United States, 354 U.S. 298, 327 (1957) (invalidating the general verdict when one of the possible
bases of conviction was legally inadequate).
204. See United States v. Keefer, 799 F.2d 1115, 1125 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Weiss, supra
note 1, at 1364 & n.103.
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constitutional due process argument set forth in Part I that courts should require
juror unanimity of theory as to true accessories before the fact." 5
Not surprisingly, commentators have confused and contorted the principles
drawn from Thompson. For example, a leading treatise cites Thompson for the
proposition that "[a] classic case for an aiding and abetting instruction is one in
which the defendant's participation in the commission of the crime is established,
but the identity of the principal is unclear."2 6 Thompson and Horton are cited as the
sole authority for that proposition.0 7
It was far from inevitable and represents an ironic triumph of legal absurdity
that Horton and Thompson are "joined at the hip." Viewing Horton and Thompson
as analytically similar is ludicrous. As previously explained, Horton involved the
classic case of two participants, both principals involved in a fatal assault, but where
it is unclear which one struck the fatal blow.20 8 Thompson, on the other hand,
presents an entirely different conceptual framework, where Thompson was the sole
defendant and clearly the one principal.2" Therefore, resorting to an aiding and
abetting analysis to resolve an otherwise insoluble Horton-type "musical chairs"
proof conundrum was unnecessary. Unfortunately but predictably, Thompson is
ultimately mischaracterized as upholding the receipt of the aiding and abetting
instruction as to Thompson "because [the] jury could have concluded that defendant
aided and abetted the principal in the distribution of cocaine base[,] rejecting
defendant's claim that he was the principal."2"'
How can anyone seriously dispute Thompson's contention that if he was
criminally liable, it could only be as a principal (and therefore the aiding and
abetting instruction as to him was improper)? If Thompson stands for the
proposition that Thompson was not a principal in the lone, simple, one-count drug
distribution charge where he was videotaped handing the cup containing the drugs
to the undercover officer, and where Douglas was nowhere in sight, then Thompson
has fatally contorted the concepts of principal and aider and abettor beyond the
point of no meaning and to the point of no return. Thus, the time has come to
reevaluate federal aiding and abetting doctrine. Regardless of whether other flexible
aiding and abetting principles remain unchanged, requiring unanimity as to theory
between a principal and an aider and abettor, which would have, in all likelihood,
at least exposed the inherent incongruity of the Thompson decision, is a small but
necessary first step.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
206. 26 JAMESWM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERALPRACTICE § 630.32[6], at 630-69 & n.47
(3d ed. 1997).
207. See id. For a discussion ofHorton, see supra notes 44-45, 65, 108 and accompanying text.
208. United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 541-42 (4th Cir. 1990).
209. United States v. Thompson, 279 F.3d 1043, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
904 (2002).
210. MOORE ET AL., supra note 206, § 630.32[6], at 630-69 n.47.
[Vol. 57: 85
50
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol57/iss1/4
2005] A CRITIQUE OF FEDERAL AIDING AND ABETTING PRINCIPLES 135
IV. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia Circuit's decision in United States v. Thompson
cannot be reconciled with recognized federal criminal law aiding and abetting
principles. The decision represents an unfortunate but predictable culmination of the
essentially limitless toleration of pro-prosecution aiding and abetting doctrines that
have been left critically unexamined for far too long.
Thompson serves as both an object lesson and as an impetus to reexamine
several supposedly well-settled aiding and abetting doctrines. Regardless of any
other doctrinal developments concerning the parameters of alternative theories of
guilt and juror unanimity, the further blurring of the distinction between a principal
and an aider and abettor only adds needless confusion to the law. As a modest first
step, unanimity as to theory should be constitutionally required, at least where
evidence is adduced as to alternate factual theories as either principal or aider and
abettor.
This requirement should result in a positive step towards commencing a
reevaluation of federal criminal law accessorial liability doctrines. Too few systemic
reevaluation opportunities exist to reign in disproportionately pro-prosecution
doctrines. Indeed, the trend over the last three decades has been almost entirely in
the opposite direction-where the legal environment has been seemingly dedicated
to making it easier for the government to obtain convictions.
Whether this reexamination of aiding and abetting doctrines will result in any
substantial doctrinal changes that harm prosecutorial theories in any measurable
manner is of course far too soon to determine. Nevertheless, given the current state
of the law, it is difficult to see how any reexamination will result in aiding and
abetting doctrines that are more favorable to the prosecution. The imposition of a
due process requirement of juror unanimity when alternative principal and aiding
and abetting theories are presented would constitute a small but important step
toward the doctrinal fairness that underlies the concept of due process in any
criminal case. Any modest movement toward a constitutional reinvigoration of a
more concrete juror unanimity requirement in criminal cases is welcome, long
overdue, and consistent with recent Supreme Court trends in reshaping due process
requirements in the context of a criminal trial. In an era of increased regulatory
criminal liability and expansive criminal liability theories in general, a reinvigorated
focus on many previously well-settled doctrines thought to be largely beyond
reexamination would be a positive development for federal criminal law in the
twenty-first century.
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